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THE FIRST AMENDMENT, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A NEW VIEWPOINT
Janai S. Nelson*
Abstract
This Article engages the equality principles of the First Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause to reconsider the constitutionality of
one of the last and most entrenched barriers to universal suffrage-felon
disenfranchisement. A deeply racialized problem, felon
disenfranchisement is additionally and independently a legislative
judgment as to which citizen's ideas are worthy of inclusion in the
electorate. Relying on a series of cases involving state interests in
protecting the ballot and promoting its intelligent use, this Article
demonstrates that felon disenfranchisement is open to attack under the
Supreme Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence when it is motivated
by a desire to limit political expression based on its perceived content;
in other words, when felon disenfranchisement is motivated by
viewpoint discrimination.
The justifications for felon disenfranchisement laws reflect a
misguided perception of how a voter's identity, status, or behavior will
affect how he votes. This Article confronts these justifications and
examines the linkages between the right to vote and First Amendment
protections of freedom of speech. Recognizing the difficulty in proving
legislative motive in electoral decisions, this Article draws upon the
underexplored theory of First Amendment Equal Protection, as well as
the Court's jurisprudence in the area of partisan gerrymandering to
formulate the claim of viewpoint discrimination and demonstrate
increasing judicial intolerance for legislative tampering in the electoral
process with suspect motives. Through its viewpoint discrimination
analysis, this Article also lays bare the multidimensional impact of felon
disenfranchisement in terms of race, class, and partisanship, thereby
highlighting the particular segments of society whose political
participation and freedom of expression are most directly infringed by
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felon disenfranchisement-and, perhaps, the underlying motivations for
the practice.
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"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics. . . . "-Justice Robert H. Jackson'
INTRODUCTION
Along the are of right to vote challenges, felon disenfranchisement
has proved an especially intractable form of vote denial. Despite robust
academic and popular skepticism concerning the constitutionality of
felon disenfranchisement laws,2 they persistently evade successful legal
challenge. This is, in part, because courts routinely interpret the legal
precedent establishing the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement
broadly to the exclusion of other claims. In Richardson v. Ramirez,' the
Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
implicitly authorizes states to deny voting rights based on a felony
conviction.4 Courts have generally relied on Ramirez to bar equal
protection challenges to felon disenfranchisement's disparate impact
and its unequal treatment of citizens with felony convictions and other
citizens.5
1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (majority opinion).
2. See, e.g., JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 20-40 (2006); Angela Behrens, Christopher
Uggen & Jeff Manza, Ballot Manipulation and the "Menace of Negro Domination": Racial
Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850-2002, 109 AM. J. Soc. 559,
572 (2003); Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE SENTENCING PROJECT
(2011), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd-bs-fdlawsinusAug2012.pdf.
More recent scholarship in this area examines the United States' disenfranchisement laws in
comparative and international contexts. See, e.g., Janai S. Nelson, Fair Measure of the Right to
Vote: A Comparative Perspective on Voting Rights Enforcement in a Maturing Democracy, 18
CARDOZO J. INT'L LAW & COMP. L. 425, 448-53 (2010); Robin L. Nunn, Lock Them Up and
Throw Away the Vote, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 763, 765-781 (2005); Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler, Legal
Outlier, Again? US. Felon Suffrage: Comparative and International Human Rights
Perspectives, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J. 197, 210-38 (2011).
3. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
4. Id. at 56.
5. The validity of this holding has been roundly contested in dissenting opinions,
including the dissenting opinions in Ramirez itself. See id. at 72-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
see also Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 359 (2d Cir. 2006) (Parker, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is clear
that the scope of Congress's enforcement authority is at its zenith when protecting against
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However, two important developments since Ramirez challenge the
seemingly unfettered discretion that legislatures exercise to enact and
maintain felon disenfranchisement statutes. The first development is a
subtle doctrinal shift that has linked the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in the realm of political participation outside the areas of
campaign finance and ballot access.6 First Amendment principles have
increasingly surfaced in voting qualification and political restructuring
cases since the Supreme Court decided the one person, one vote cases of
the 1960s. More recently, the Court's partisan gerrymandering
opinions-majority, concurring, and dissenting-have acknowledged
the First Amendment's relevance to contemplating fairness and equality
in the electoral process.7 The First Amendment, although not applied
directly, seems to be influencing the scrutiny in such cases (some more
than others), resulting in heightened constitutional protection in the
electoral arena.8
The second development since Ramirez is one that predates the
Court's partisan gerrymandering claims and directly limits Ramirez.
Although Ramirez held that state felon disenfranchisement laws do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause per se,9 in Hunter v. Underwood,10
discrimination based on suspect classifications (such as race), or when protecting fundamental
rights (such as voting."); Johnson v. Govemor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (Wilson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that states have no
affirmative grant of power to disenfranchise criminals under Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); id. at 1244-45, 1247, 1251 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the summary
judgment grant on both the Equal Protection and the Voting Rights Act claims). Challenges to
felon disenfranchisement laws brought under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)), have
also proved unsuccessful.
6. See, e.g., John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1103, 1120 (2005) (noting
the Court's "shift in emphasis" in modem speech cases toward content-based discrimination and
an antidiscrimination principle away from the inherent value of speech); Elena Kagan, Private
Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 413, 414, 428-32 (1996); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53
STAN. L. REv. 767, 768, 776 (2001) (arguing that First Amendment cases should be decided
exclusively on the question of motive).
7. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 461-62 (2006)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part).
8. This is less the case in the area of partisan gerrymandering than campaign finance and
ballot access. See generally Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative
Process, 47 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 87 (2010) ("In the campaign context ... the very point of
many contributions is to provide a 'gift[] from citizens who simply wish to express their
ideological commitment to a candidate's causes . . . ' [a]nd the First Amendment grants
individuals the right to advance and support their political views in this way." (quoting BRUCE
ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 7
(2002))).
9. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 56.
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the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from
disenfranchising citizens with felony convictions if the
disenfranchisement is motivated by race.' Put another way, if the
motive to deny the right to vote is based on race, the regulation violates
the Equal Protection Clause despite Ramirez's sanction of felon
disenfranchisement. This Article applies the Hunter rationale
prohibiting race discrimination to a theory of viewpoint discrimination
in the enactment and maintenance of felon disenfranchisement laws.
The principal claim is straightforward: If a state's motive or interest in
denying voting rights to citizens with felony convictions is based on
how those persons might vote, then the regulation denies those citizens
equal protection of the laws and fails strict scrutiny. In short, an
impermissible motive that constrains a fundamental right is
constitutionally suspect.
But how can the Equal Protection Clause apply to viewpoint
discrimination, which falls squarely and traditionally within the domain
of the First Amendment? This Article advances the under-explored
theory of "First Amendment Equal Protection"l 2 to address the equality
concerns in the electoral sphere that engage both the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. First Amendment Equal Protection is a unique
species of equal protection that is informed by First Amendment
protections of free speech and expression in the political realm. By
applying First Amendment principles, First Amendment Equal
Protection fortifies the equal protection inquiry by (1) requiring clear
government standards, (2) broadening justiciability of claims, (3)
providing leniency toward facial challenges, and (4) increasing judicial
fact-finding.13 These four factors distinguish First Amendment Equal
Protection from conventional equal protection and counteract, in part,
the Court's disregard of disparate impact.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays the groundwork for the
viewpoint discrimination claim against felon disenfranchisement laws.
In addition to defining viewpoint discrimination, Part I analyzes the
Court's jurisprudence in a series of cases concerning residency
10. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
11. See infra note 178. In Hunter v. Underwood, the Court held that Ramirez's permit to
disenfranchise did not include disenfranchisement based on intentional racial discrimination.
471 U.S. at 233 ("[W]e are confident that [Section] 2 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was not
designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimination . .. which otherwise violates
§[Section] I of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in our opinion in Richardson v.
Ramirez ... suggests the contrary.").
12. Daniel P. Tokaji coined the phrase "First Amendment Equal Protection" in his article,
First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 MIcH. L.




requirements and other voting qualifications that reveal a judicial theory
of viewpoint discrimination in voting regulations. It then examines the
justifications for felon disenfranchisement that form the basis of a
viewpoint discrimination claim, identifying both the perceived
viewpoint that legislatures intend to exclude and the viewpoint that is
ultimately excised from the electoral process. Part II introduces First
Amendment Equal Protection as a viable theory in which to couch a
viewpoint discrimination claim. In light of the lack of precedent
applying the First Amendment directly to voting cases and the strength
of the Equal Protection Clause in this area, First Amendment Equal
Protection maximizes the equality protections for the right to vote
through the combined force of both doctrines.
Part III considers three challenges to applying First Amendment
Equal Protection to a viewpoint discrimination claim against felon
disenfranchisement. First, it briefly explores the omission of First
Amendment jurisprudence from election law and the question of
whether voting is speech. Second, it recognizes the formidable impact
of Ramirez in the Equal Protection context as a shield against challenges
to felon disenfranchisement laws. Finally, using the Court's partisan-
gerrymandering cases starting with Vieth v. Jubilierer, this Part unpacks
the opinions to demonstrate that, as in excessively partisan redistricting,
viewpoint discrimination in felon disenfranchisement poses a danger of
excessive legislative manipulation of the political process. As evidenced
in its political-gerrymandering jurisprudence, the Court is concerned
about the boundaries of state influence in the electoral process. The
concerns raised by felon disenfranchisement are not materially different.
The Article concludes that a viewpoint discrimination-based
challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws would not necessarily lead
to the undoing of these pervasive regulations. Rather, such a challenge
reveals the unconstitutionality of certain justifications for these laws
and, in some cases, may provide a sufficient basis for repealing state
statutes that are based on these motives.
I. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AND VOTING
Despite the substantive overlap between freedom of expression and
voting, the Court has been loath to treat voting as a right protected
under the First Amendment. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,14
while deciding whether a poll tax was a constitutionally-permissible
prerequisite to voting, the Court confronted whether the First
Amendment applies to vote-denial claims.15 The Court's opinion
14. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
15. Id. at 664-65.
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acknowledged petitioners' argument that the First Amendment
implicitly guarantees a right to vote in state elections that may not be
conditioned upon payment of a tax or fee.16 However, the Court
ultimately avoided deciding the matter on First Amendment grounds
and instead relied on the Equal Protection Clause to strike down the
practice. 17
By evading the question of whether the First Amendment also
applies to restrictions on voting, the Harper Court set a judicial course
that limited vote denial claims to the Fourteenth Amendment-a course
from which the Court has strayed very little. The Court's failure to
either accept or reject a relationship between the First Amendment and
the right to vote has resulted in a less than coherent application of the
First Amendment in the electoral arena. Nonetheless, First
Amendment principles have continued to percolate within voting rights
jurisprudence. Notably, concerns of viewpoint discrimination, although
16. Id. at 665 ("It is argued that the right to vote in state elections is implicit, particularly
by reason of the First Amendment and that it may not constitutionally be conditioned upon the
payment of a tax or fee.").
17. Id. ("We do not stop to canvass the relation between voting and political expression.
For it is enough to say that once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be
drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
For a compelling discussion of the associational interests and, particularly, how they relate to
race and partisanship, see Guy-Uriel Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First
Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1239-60 (2003) (arguing that the First
Amendment protects the right of voters of color to associate as voters of color where race and
political identity are correlated).
18. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
HARV. L. REV. 29, 39 (2004) (noting that "[g]errymandering was cubbyholed as an equal
protection problem; campaign finance, as a First Amendment problem," creating "little sense of
an organizing principle to 'the law of politics'); Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes,
Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1803, 1819 (1999) (arguing
"that First Amendment public discourse has drifted toward too high a level of abstraction and
generality-a level that cannot make sense of the actual cases themselves"); Tokaji, First
Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2496 ("Harper's avoidance of this question has
hindered the recognition of the links between the First Amendment and the principle of equal
participation. Had the Court addressed the question, it might have avoided the confusion evident
in such cases over the proper relationship between First Amendment equality and equality in
other areas of political participation ever since.").
Indeed, even in the initial development of campaign-finance and ballot-access cases where
the First Amendment figures prominently, the Court was reluctant to acknowledge its
application. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 445 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with the majority's finding that a ban on write-in voting did not implicate the First
Amendment right to expression because, "[a]s the majority points out, the purpose of casting,
counting, and recording votes is to elect public officials, not to serve as a general forum for
political expression"); see also Emily M. Calhoun, The First Amendment and Distributional
Voting Rights Controversies, 52 TENN. L. REV. 549, 550-51 (1985) (discussing the relevance of
First Amendment principles to voting-rights controversies).
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not labeled as such, have informed voting rights jurisprudence since the
1800s.19 As explained more fully below, the viewpoint discrimination in
these early cases involved voting qualifications based on a potential
voter's suspected outlook in light of their presumed or actual beliefs.20
Until relatively recently, restrictions that embodied such viewpoint
discrimination were unchallenged.
A. Defining Viewpoint Discrimination
Viewpoint discrimination is widely considered the most pernicious
incursion on First Amendment rights.21 When Justice Robert Jackson
announced the limits of government speech regulation in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,22 he situated the concept of
viewpoint discrimination at the apex of the hierarchy of constitutional
protections. The Court has continued to advance this vision of the First
Amendment by routinely castigating government regulations that "cast
a pall of orthodoxy"23 or are "aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas." 24 Other concerns involve the potential distortion viewpoint-
based restrictions can cause in the "marketplace of ideas" and their
impact on the "thinking process of the community" for purposes of
abetting democratic government.25
19. See Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 35 (1885); see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333, 346-48 (1890).
20. Murphy, 114U.S at46-47; Davis, 113 U.S. at 341,346-47.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) ("It is
rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible."); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 581
(1965) (Black, J., concurring) ("[Viewpoint-based regulation is] censorship in a most odious
form . . . ."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem ofFreedom
of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 49, 56 (2000)
("[V]iewpoint restrictions have never been upheld."); id. at 59 ("Nothing is more inconsistent
with freedom of speech than for the government to use its awesome power to advance some
views and suppress or disfavor others."); Fee, supra note 6, at 1104 ("Under current law,
content-based speech regulations are highly disfavored and are presumptively
unconstitutional."); Kagan, supra note 6, at 443-44 ("Content-based restrictions on speech-
restrictions that by their terms limit expression on the basis of what is said-usually are subject
to far more rigorous scrutiny.").
22. 319 U.S. 624, 625, 642 (1943) (invalidating a public school compulsory flag salute
because it impermissibly "prescribe[d] what shall be orthodox" in the realm of politics,
conscience, and ideas in violation of the First Amendment).
23. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) (invalidating as vague and overbroad a New York law that mandated termination of
public school and university teachers for any "treasonable or seditious utterance").
24 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (quoting Am. Commc'n Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)).
25. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 27 (1948); see also Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("There
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The concept of viewpoint discrimination is not grounded in the text
of the First Amendment itself. Rather, it was created by the Court as a
tool for distinguishing those regulations of speech or expression that
seek to advance "legitimate regulatory goal[s]" 26 from those that seek
"to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public
debate through coercion rather than persuasion." 27 Although the Court
has never delimited precisely what constitutes viewpoint
discrimination, certain basic principles pervade the common
understanding of the term. At its core, the viewpoint discrimination test
reflects the broad concept that government cannot regulate speech based
on its content,29 and regulations must be neutral as to both viewpoint
and subject matter.3 0 Viewpoint neutrality forbids the government from
basing regulations on the ideology of the message or by extension, the
is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas' . . . ." (citing MEIKLEJOHN, supra)). There is also an
element of self-determination coupled with broader collective democracy ideals that undergirds
the Court's intolerance of viewpoint discrimination. In writing for the Court in Turner, Justice
Anthony Kennedy explained:
At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should
decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon
this ideal. Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or
that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government,
contravenes this essential right.
Turner, 512 U.S. at 641 (citations omitted).
26. Turner, 512 U.S. at 641.
27. Id.; see Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 47 (1885); see also Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333, 348 (1890).
28. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998)
(concluding that preventing an independent candidate from participating in a debate is facially
neutral); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590 (1998) (finding that a
federal law that allowed the National Endowment for the Arts to consider "decency" and
"respect for values" was viewpoint-neutral); Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 58.
29. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.").
30. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 463 (1980); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980). Subject-matter neutrality refers to the unconstitutionality of the
government regulating speech based on the topic of the speech. See Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at
537. "Content" and "viewpoint" are often used interchangeably by courts, thereby muddling the
doctrinal development of these distinct claims. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819,
829-31 (1995) (noting the imprecise "distinction between, on the one hand, content
discrimination, which may be permissible .. . and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination,




The consensus among the ideologies underlying the prohibition of
viewpoint discrimination is the fear of government regulation for
impermissible ends.32 Indeed, the overarching concern with viewpoint
31. See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984) (asking whether a law was "designed to suppress certain ideas that the City finds
distasteful"); Kagan, supra note 6; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 227-28 (1983). In her article Private Speech, Public
Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, Associate Justice
Elena Kagan, then a law professor at the University of Chicago Law School, defined
impermissible government motive under the First Amendment as a form of viewpoint
discrimination:
First, the government may not restrict expressive activities because it disagrees
with or disapproves of the ideas espoused by the speaker; it may not act on the
basis of a view of what is a true (or false) belief or a right (or wrong) opinion.
Or, to say this in a slightly different way, the government cannot count as a
harm, which it has a legitimate interest in preventing, that ideas it considers
faulty or abhorrent enter the public dialogue and challenge the official
understanding of acceptability or correctness. Second, though relatedly, the
government may not restrict speech because the ideas espoused threaten
officials' own self-interest-more particularly, their tenure in office. The
government, to use the same construction as above, cannot count as a harm,
which it has a legitimate interest in preventing, that speech may promote the
removal of incumbent officeholders through the political process. Third, and as
a corollary to these proscriptions, the government may not privilege either ideas
it favors or ideas advancing its self-interest-for example, by exempting certain
ideas from a general prohibition. Justice Scalia summarized these tenets in
R.A. V.: "The government may not regulate (speech) based on hostility-or
favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed." To this statement of
illicit motive, one further gloss must be added: the government may not limit
speech because other citizens deem the ideas offered to be wrong or
offensive-or for that matter, because they see the ideas as threatening to
incumbent officials. This ban echoes those just stated, except for the identity of
the party (above the government, now the public) that disapproves the ideas;
the theory is that this substitution of party name should make no constitutional
difference.... The key principle with respect to motive is that the government
may not limit speech on grounds of mere disapproval, no matter whose or how
widely shared.
Kagan, supra note 6, at 428-30 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Justice Kagan's
definition is particularly relevant to the consideration of felon disenfranchisement laws because
of the political nature of the act of voting, its potential impact on electoral outcomes, and the
unpopular status that citizens with felony convictions hold.
32. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) ("[T]he 'principal
inquiry in determining content neutrality . .. is whether the government has adopted a regulation
of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys."' (citing Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
386 (1992) ("The government may not regulate [speech] based on hostility-or favoritism-
towards the underlying message expressed.").
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discrimination is its deleterious effect on democratic legitimacy.
Professor James Weinstein describes the right to participate in self-
governance as a core speech norm that can be eroded by viewpoint
discrimination's effect on both actual governance and individual
perceptions of legitimacy:
If an individual is excluded from participating in public
discourse because the government disagrees with the
speaker's views or because it finds the ideas expressed too
disturbing or offensive, any decision taken as a result of
that discussion would, as to such an excluded citizen, lack
legitimacy. ... This explains free speech doctrine's fierce
opposition to viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on
public discourse. This concern for legitimacy also explains
why the right to participate in public discourse free of
government-imposed content restriction is not just a
collective interest inherent in popular sovereignty, but also
a fundamental individual right that government may
legitimately infringe, if at all, only in truly extraordinary
33circumstances.
Democratic legitimacy is rooted in the Court's concern that
legislative "coercion" through the manipulation of public debate will
characterize our democratic structures, replacing "persuasion" through
an unfiltered exchange of ideas. 34 The work of the viewpoint
discrimination claim is to ensure that the legislative motive behind
enacting or maintaining regulations does not amount to manipulation of
the democratic process. As Professor Weinstein points out, viewpoint
discrimination threatens both "a collective interest inherent in popular
sovereignty" and "a fundamental individual right." 35 The collective
interest inherent in popular sovereignty recognizes viewpoint
discrimination as a structural harm. Instead of limiting its impact to the
infringement of an individual right, viewpoint discrimination is a
broader threat to governance, legitimacy, and checks and balances.
Indeed, viewpoint discrimination permits an evasion of the democratic
process by permitting the state to excise unwanted voices from the body
politic.
33. James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 498 (2011) [hereinafter Weinstein, Participatory
Democracy] (footnote omitted); see also James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political
Legitimacy: A Response to Ed Baker, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 363-64 (2011).
34. Turner, 512 U.S. at 641.
35. Weinstein, Participatory Democracy, supra note 33, at 498.
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Admittedly, the distinction between "status" or "speaker," on the one
hand, and "viewpoint," on the other, can be blurry at times. To the
extent that the government denies a speaker freedom of speech or
expression because of her identity, depending on the motive, the
government may also be basing its denial on the suspected viewpoint of
that speaker based on the speaker's identity. For example, one could
argue that felon disenfranchisement is only a status-based restriction
and does not involve anyone's viewpoint. This form of "speaker
discrimination," however, is indistinguishable from other forms of
content discrimination. 36 Indeed, "[w]hether speaker discrimination is
treated as content discrimination might be framed as a question of
governmental motive, whereby the more closely a speaker is identified
with a particular viewpoint the more likely a decision promoting or
disabling that speaker will be seen as an exercise of content
discrimination."3 In the case of felon disenfranchisement, speaker and
speech discrimination are two sides of the same coin. As this Article
demonstrates, citizens with felony convictions are denied the right to
vote because of the perceived viewpoint they would express at the polls.
The broad exclusion of certain groups from the electoral process
based on their perceived ideology potentially affects electoral outcomes
and distorts the function of the democratic process. A clear example of
this is the matter of partisan gerrymandering. Partisan gerrymandering
is characterized by excessive manipulation of the redistricting process to
achieve electoral advantages for a political party.38 When this occurs,
the right to vote remains intact, but the voter's will is compromised for
partisan gain. Although voters can cast a ballot, their will to have their
votes aggregated in a manner that gives them a fair shot at achieving a
desired electoral outcome is sacrificed to self-dealing legislatures. The
result is a governance system that does not reflect the will of the people
and thus lacks legitimacy.
Felon disenfranchisement, when motivated by concerns about how
voters will cast their ballots, undermines the electoral process. As
Section I.C describes, much of the rhetoric justifying the exclusion of
citizens with felony convictions from the electorate describes concerns
about electoral outcomes-mafiosi electing judges-and the
advancement of a pro-crime agenda by a menacing voting bloc. This
outlook, ascribed to citizens with felony convictions, might be termed
the "criminal viewpoint." Lacking empirical grounding, the criminal
36. Fee, supra note 6, at 1130 ("[T]here appears to be no singular First Amendment
approach to speaker discrimination in relation to content discrimination."); see also Robert Post,
Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REv. 477, 480-82 (2011).
37. Fee, supra note 6, at 1130.
38. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring).
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viewpoint is a judicial fiction based on a narrative of fear and reprisal
that results in electoral exclusion. More importantly, even if some
citizens with criminal convictions shared a criminal viewpoint, for
reasons explained below, it would be unlawful to exclude them from the
electoral process on this basis.
B. A Judicial Theory of Viewpoint Discrimination in Voting
Regulations
Evidence of the Court's ambivalence toward applying the First
Amendment to voting-rights cases may be found in a body of cases that
employs tenets of the viewpoint discrimination doctrine without
expressly relying on the First Amendment. The Court's peculiar
doctrinal evolution began with Murphy v. Ramsey39 in 1885. There, the
Court upheld a congressional Act40 disqualifying bigamists and
polygamists from voting in the Utah territory based on an expansive
conception of a sovereign's right to regulate voting.41 Specifically, the
Court held that conditioning voting qualifications on whether a potential
voter is a polygamist "is . . . for the sole purpose of determining, as in
[the] case of every other condition attached to the right of suffrage, the
qualification of one who alleges his right to vote."4 2 It reasoned that
interrogating a voter's status as a polygamist "is precisely similar to an
inquiry into the fact of nativity, of age, or of any other status made
necessary by law as a condition of the elective franchise."43 The Court
further held that voting qualifications can serve as a means to "withdraw
all political influence from those who are practically hostile" to
prevailing social values." In this way, the Court expressly permitted
states to enact voter qualifications that were motivated by a desire to
exclude voters deemed hostile to the status quo. In other words, the
Court sanctioned viewpoint discrimination in voting.
39. 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
40. In 1882, Congress passed the Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act. The Act provided that
polygamy was a felony punishable by five years of imprisonment and a $500 fine, and that
convicted polygamists were disenfranchised and were ineligible to hold political office. 48
U.S.C. § 1461 (1882) (repealed 1983).
41. Murphy, 114 U.S. at 45, 47 (justifying the restriction based on the notion that it
protected the institution of marriage between one man and one woman as "the sure foundation
of all that is stable and noble in our civilization[ and] the best guaranty of that reverent morality
which is the source of all beneficent progress in social and political improvement").
42. Id. at 43.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 45.
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Likewise, in Davis v. Beason,45 the Court upheld an Idaho statute
that required prospective voters to take an oath that they were not,
among other things, "a bigamist or polygamist ... [or] a member of any
order, organization or association which teaches, advises, counsels or
encourages its members or devotees or any other persons to commit the
crime of bigamy or polygamy, or any other crime defined by law."A6
This time analyzing the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the
Court held that state legislatures have the power to prescribe any
reasonable voter qualifications so long as those qualifications do not
contravene enfranchising amendments to the Constitution. 7 Here, the
Court applied the First Amendment to a voting qualification but not as a
matter of free expression or speech. In addition, although the practice of
polygamy constituted a felony under both Idaho and Utah laws,48
neither Davis nor Murphy involved felon disenfranchisement per se
because the plaintiffs had not been convicted of polygamy but, rather,
were deprived of the right to vote because of their suspected
49
commission or advocacy of that crime.
Roughly half a century later, the Court rejected the reasoning in
Murphy and Davis that permitted viewpoint discrimination.o As the
Court was entering the political thicket in one person, one vote cases
and affirming voting as a fundamental right, the Court considered
another set of cases involving restrictions on the right to vote based on
how that right might be exercised. In particular, these cases centered on
durational residency requirements and states' interest in shaping their
electorates. In Carrington v. Rash, 51 for example, the Warren Court
considered the State of Texas's argument that military personnel who
were new residents to the state might not have sufficient local interests
45. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). Together, Murphy and Davis have been termed "the Mormon
cases." Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional
Prohibitions Against Polygamy are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 691, 710, 716-17 (2001).
46. Davis, 133 U.S. at 333 (quoting REV. ST. IDAHO §§ 501, 504).
47. Id at 346. For example, the Court noted that suffrage was restricted to citizens of the
United States above the age of twenty-one, or persons above that age who had declared their
intention to become such citizens, and suffrage could not be denied to any citizen on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Id.
48. Davis, 133 U.S. at 333; Murphy, 114 U.S. at 26-30.
49. Davis, 133 U.S. at 334-37; Murphy, 114 U.S. at 42-44. In Murphy, the Court held
that the plaintiffs, suspected of past practices of polygamy that were not ongoing when they
sought to register to vote, were wrongfully and maliciously denied the right to vote. Id. at 47.
50. Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the
Debate Over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1152 (2004) ("[A]t least since
Carrington v. Rash, what we might call 'viewpoint discrimination' is also no longer a legitimate
basis for disqualifying voters . . .
51. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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52
to qualify them as voters in state elections. Rejecting this argument,
the Court held that a state's "'[flencing out' from the franchise a sector
of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally
impermissible." 53 The Court's reasoning in Carrington reflects the basic
underpinnings of viewpoint discrimination; however, the Court makes
no mention of the First Amendment.
Kramer v. Union School District,54 Cipriano v. City ofHouma,55 and
Dunn v. Blumstein56 further expanded this line of reasoning. Kramer
held that voting restrictions that require residents to have a discernible
interest in the subject matter of the election are unconstitutional.
Kramer challenged section 2012 of the New York Education Law that
required that all voters in school district elections either own or lease
taxable real property in the district or be parents or custodians of one or
more children enrolled in a public school within the district." The
plaintiff, a childless bachelor who resided, but did not own property, in
the Union School District, challenged the voter qualification under the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 9 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that
the state's justification of limiting the franchise to persons primarily
affected by education was unconstitutional.6 o Likewise, in Cipriano,
decided the same day as Kramer, the Court held that provisions of
Louisiana law restricting voting rights to property taxpayers in elections
concerning the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility were an
52. Id. at 91-94.
53. Id. at 94 (emphasis added); see also Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 484 F.3d
436, 437 (7th Cir. 2007) (Wood, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc) ("[Wihen there is a
serious risk that an election law has been passed with the intent of imposing an additional
significant burden on the right to vote of a specific group of voters, the court must apply strict
scrutiny.").
54. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
55. 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per curiam).
56. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
57 Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632-33. Kramer and like cases are distinguishable from cases
such as Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973), in
which the Court upheld a statute that limited voting for the board of directors of a water district
to landowners, specifically apportioning votes in the elections according to the assessed
valuation of the land. Id. at 734-35; see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441-42 (1992)
(holding that Hawaii's prohibition of write-in voting does not unreasonably infringe upon its
citizens' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments). These cases are further
distinguishable from felon disenfranchisement laws on the ground that felon disenfranchisement
disallows voting in all elections based on felon or ex-felon status.
58. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 622.
59. Id. at 624-25.
60. Id. at 630-33. But see id at 636 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (reasoning that legislation
violates the Equal Protection Clause "only 'if it rest[s] on grounds wholly irrelevant to
achievement of the regulation's objectives"' (quoting Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947))).
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unconstitutional denial of equal protection.61 The Court expressly
admonished that "differences of opinion cannot justify excluding" any
group or person from the franchise. 6 2
Three years later, in Dunn v. Blumstein, the same Court also
rejected the argument that states have a valid interest in ensuring that
potential voters have a "common interest" in local government
matters.64 In that case, the Tennessee legislature required residents to
have lived in the state for a year and in the county for three months in
order to be eligible to vote on the grounds that this durational residency
requirement furthered the goal of creating a "knowledgeable" electorate
and ensuring ballot integrity.6 1 Specifically, the Tennessee legislature's
stated interests were to:
(1) INSURE PURITY OF BALLOT BOX-Protection
against fraud through colonization and inability to identify
persons offering to vote, and [ensure voting by a]
(2) KNOWLEDGEABLE VOTER-Afford some surety
that the voter has, in fact, become a member of the
community and that as such, he has a common interest in
all matters pertaining to its government and is, therefore,
more likely to exercise his right more intelligently.66
The "purity of the ballot box" rationale generally refers to combating
fraudulent voting through voter impersonation, dual residency, or other
forms of voter fraud. 67 "Promoting intelligent use of the ballot" or "a
knowledgeable electorate" in this context embodies the notion that
newly domiciled voters can be denied the franchise because they might
have opinions or viewpoints that differ from long-term residents.
Although the Court previously held in Lassiter v. Northampton
County Board of Elections69 that states may impose rules on voting that
61. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705-06 (1969) (per curiam).
62. Id. at 705.
63. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
64. Id. at 354-57.
65. Id. at 334, 345.
66. Id. at 345 (citing appellants' brief).
67. Id. at 345-46.
68. Id. at 354-56.
69. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). Despite the Supreme Court sanction of literacy tests in Lassiter,
such tests have been subject to a legislative prohibition since 1970 in acknowledgment of their
past and potential discriminatory use. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-285, § 6, 84 Stat. 315 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (2006)) ("No citizen shall
be denied, because of his failure to comply with any test or device, the right to vote in any
Federal, State, or local election .... ). The term "test or device" was defined to include, in part,
"any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting
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are reasonably designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot,70 the
Dunn Court rejected the durational residency requirement as a means of
achieving this goal because the state's common interest rationale
referred to how and what voters thought as opposed to their aptitude.n
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall explained
that, while the state could legitimately require that voters reside in the
geographic divisions in which they sought to vote, the durational
residency requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
was not necessary to achieve this goal.72 Instead, the state's purported
interest in creating a knowledgeable electorate through this method was
a thinly veiled attempt to condition the right to vote on the viewpoints
and opinions that might be expressed through the exercise of that
right. Justice Marshall further warned that "the criterion of
'intelligent' voting is an elusive one, and susceptible of abuse."74 Justice
Marshall's concerns were shared by the 89th Congress, which enacted
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.75 In the congressional hearings that led
to the Act's passage, Congress recognized that "in some instances
[durational residency requirements have] the impermissible purpose or
effect of denyi citizens the right to vote ... because of the way they
may vote ....
Carrington, Kramer, Cipriano, and Dunn all limited states' ability to
exclude a segment of the population from the franchise based on how
they might vote. Although none of these cases formally overturned
(1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, [or]
(2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject. . . ."
Id.; see also Dunn, 405 U.S. at 357 n.29 ("By prohibiting various "'test[s].' and ."device[s]"'
that would clearly assure knowledgeability on the part of voters in local elections, Congress
declared federal policy that people should be allowed to vote even if they were not well
informed about the issues." (alterations in original)).
70. Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 53-54.
71. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 355 (citing Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705-06
(1969) (per curiam)).
72. Id. at 343-54; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, et seq., 84 Stat. 316, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973aa-l(a)(2) (2006) (citing a congressional finding that a durational residence requirement
"'denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free movement
across State lines'). Justice Marshall further suggested that in order for the state to rationally
promote intelligent use of the ballot through restrictive-voter qualifications, there must be
evidence of the state's universal efforts to further this interest through less restrictive means. In
the case of Tennessee, he counseled that efforts had never been made to advance this interest
through less constricting ways. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 358-59. See infra notes 124-27 and
accompanying text for further discussion.
73. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 355 (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965)).
74. Id. at 356.
75. Voting Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6 (1970).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l(a)(4) (1970).
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Murphy and Davis, the Court's subsequent opinion in Romer v. Evans7 7
effectively eviscerated any precedential value they might have on this
question, and it repudiated the notion that voting can be permissibly
restricted based on viewpoint:
To the extent Davis held that persons advocating a certain
practice may be denied the right to vote, it is. no longer
good law. To the extent it held that the groups designated in
the statute may be deprived of the right to vote because of
their status, its ruling could not stand without surviving
strict scrutiny, a most doubtful outcome.78
In separately considering discrimination based on status, the Romer
Court exempted the practice of felon disenfranchisement, citing
Richardson v. Ramirez.79 Importantly, however, the Court did not
foreclose a viewpoint challenge to felon disenfranchisement and, in fact,
created an opening for a viewpoint discrimination claim in this context
by citing Brandenburg v. Ohio8 0 to support its holding that the
viewpoint discrimination once sanctioned in Davis was no longer good
law. Accordingly, to the extent that felon disenfranchisement laws are
motivated by impermissible viewpoint discrimination, an equal
protection challenge that is not based on felon status but rather on
viewpoint discrimination is viable. Indeed, as Hunter v. Underwood
permits challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws when motivated by
intentional discrimination, 82 so do Romer and the line of cases
extending from Carrington permit challenges to felon
77. 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (holding that legislation that denied anti-discrimination
protection to homosexuals is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
78. Id. at 634 (citation omitted); see also id. at 650 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Insofar
as Beason permits the imposition of adverse consequences based upon mere advocacy, it has
been overruled by subsequent cases .... ); Karlan, supra note 50, at 1152 ("The repudiation of
Davis means that denying individuals the right to vote either because they endorse criminal
behavior or because they would vote to change existing criminal laws is constitutionally
impermissible." (footnote omitted)); Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised
Felons and the Constitutional No Man's Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 105 (2005) ("[T]he
majority in Romer v. Evans specifically repudiated Beason (and, by implication,
Murphy). . .. ").
79. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (stating that the practice of felon disenfranchisement "is not
implicated by our decision and is unexceptionable" (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24
(1974))); see also id. at 650 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]nsofar as Beason holds that convicted
felons may be denied the right to vote, it remains good law.").
80. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment protects inflammatory
speech, including the advocacy of violence, unless it is directed to inciting and likely to incite
"imminent lawless action").
81. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
82. 471 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1985).
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disenfranchisement laws that are motivated by viewpoint
discrimination. 83 Although the Court has not expressly applied the First
Amendment in voting rights cases, these cases demonstrate that the
Court has employed the doctrine of viewpoint discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Viewpoint Discrimination Justifications for Felon
Disenfranchisement
Out of all the justifications for felon disenfranchisement laws, the
justifications that are generally proffered in legislative history, historical
accounts of their enactment, and judicial opinions reveal three
prominent themes: (1) purity of the ballot box or "ballot integrity," (2)
intelligent use of the ballot, and (3) social contract theory. Each of these
justifications rests on viewpoint discrimination to varying degrees and
represents legislative justifications that do not comport with the judicial
theory of viewpoint discrimination outlined above. In addition, as
described further in Section II.C, these justifications abet a structural
harm that the Court has been increasingly unwilling to countenance in
other electoral contexts-namely, partisan gerrymandering.
1. Ballot integrity, Purity of the Ballot Box, Subversive Voting, and
Other Viewpoint-Laced Morality Arguments
The most prevalent justifications for felon disenfranchisement laws
assume that citizens with felony convictions have an unfavorable
viewpoint that will be expressed through the ballot. These theories are
framed in terms such as purity of the ballot box, ballot integrity, and
"subversive voting." They each share the premise that citizens with
felony convictions "lack the moral judgment to vote responsibly."84
Also termed the "internal instrumental reason,"85 this judgment
concerns the potential corruption of the electoral process b the
presumed transgressive views of citizens convicted of a felony. The
83. See infra Section III.B.
84. Bailey Figler, Note, A Vote for Democracy: Confronting the Racial Aspects of Felon
Disenfranchisement, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 723, 736 (2006) ("The 'purity of the ballot
box' theory relies on the outdated and illegal policy of state exclusion from voting rights for
citizens who lack certain qualities of mind or character." (citing Karlan, supra note 50, at 1158-
60)).
85. PERCEY LEHNING & ALBERT WEALE, CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE IN THE
NEw EUROPE 19 (1997).
86. See Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d. Cir. 1967) (pointing
out that the "contention that the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause requires New York to allow
convicted mafiosi to vote for district attorneys or judges would not only be without merit but as
obviously so as anything can be").
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internal instrumental reason also embodies a judgment of the moral
capacity of persons with criminal convictions to vote. Followed to its
logical conclusion, this argument supports the most extreme strand of
these rationales-subversive voting.
The theory of subversive voting perceives citizens with felony
convictions as having the intention and ability to form a political lobby
that will seek to enforce a pro-crime anti-law enforcement agenda,
ultimately threatening public safety. The concern of preventing
subversive voting and the related concerns of ballot integrity and purity
of the ballot box have been expressed most forcefully by the judiciary in
scrutinizing the constitutionality of these laws. Beginning with the
earliest felon disenfranchisement case, Washington v. State,8 courts
reinforced theories of viewpoint discrimination as permissible
motivations for the enactment and maintenance of felon
disenfranchisement laws. In 1884, the Alabama Supreme Court in
Washington stated:
The manifest purpose [of felon disenfranchisement laws] is
to preserve the purity of the ballot box, which is the only
sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs
protection against the invasion of corruption, just as much
as against that of ignorance, incapacity, or tyranny.... The
presumption is, that one rendered infamous by conviction
of felony, or other base offense indicative of great moral
turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage, or to
hold office, upon terms of equality with freemen who are
clothed by the State with the toga of political citizenship. It
is proper, therefore, that this class should be denied a right,
the exercise of which might sometimes hazard the welfare
of communities, if not that of the State itself, at least in
close political contests. 89
By highlighting the potential impact of felon disenfranchisement on
electoral outcomes, the court revealed its intent to permit these laws for
the purpose of denying the franchise to citizens because of how their
viewpoints may inform the exercise of that right and how, in turn, the
exercise of that right might affect governance. Nearly a century later,
and eight years before Ramirez, in Otsuka v. Hite,90 the state appellate
87. See Susan E. Marquardt, Comment, Deprivation of a Felon's Right to Vote:
Constitutional Concerns, Policy Issues and Suggested Reform for Felony Disenfranchisement
Law, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 279, 285-86 (2005).
88. 75 Ala. 582 (1884).
89. Id. at 585.
90. 414 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1966).
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court in California commented on the above-quoted reasoning in
Washington and concluded that felon voting would lead to voter fraud
and potentially dilute the voting power of other citizens.9' Specifically,
the court stated of Washington:
In this passage lies a frank recognition of at least one
tenable ground for depriving a former criminal of the vote:
i.e., the fact that such person committed a crime is evidence
that he was morally 'corrupt' at the time he did so; if still
morally corrupt when given the opportunity to vote in an
election, he might defile 'the purity of the ballot box' by
selling or bartering his vote or otherwise engaging in
election fraud; and such activity might affect the outcome
of the election and thus frustrate the freely expressed will
of the remainder of the voters, 'at least in close political
contests.' . . . Avoidance of such a danger, when present, is
an adequately compelling state interest to justify an
appropriate restriction on the right to vote.92
The Otsuka plaintiffs were denied the right to vote under California's
felon disenfranchisement statute because they had pled guilty to a
violation of the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 as
conscientious objectors to World War II.93 The court held that this
crime was not "infamous" per the statute and thus could not provide a
basis for disenfranchisement. 94 Rejecting plaintiffs' argument that
California's felon disenfranchisement scheme was premised on a
punishment rationale, the court found that "[c]oupled as it is with an
exclusion in cases of minors, idiots, insane persons, and those unable to
read the Constitution and write their names, the category of persons
convicted of an 'infamous crime' appears rather to be an attempt to
describe a nonpenal qualification of Fitness for voting."95 The court
91. Id. at 417. To the extent that felon disenfranchisement laws are concerned with
limiting the relative voice of citizens with criminal convictions vis-A-vis other citizens, they run
curiously afoul of the Court's longstanding campaign-finance jurisprudence that eschews an
equalization approach. In passages central to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam),
the Court famously held that "equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to
influence the outcome of elections" was not a constitutionally permissible purpose and that "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Id at 48-49.
92. Otsuka, 414 P.2d at 417.
93. Id. at 414-15.
94. Id. at 425 ("[I]t cannot reasonably be said that plaintiffs' violation of the Selective
Service Act branded them as morally corrupt and dishonest men convicted of an 'infamous
crime' as that phrase is used in article II, section 1, of the California Constitution.").
95. Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
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distinguished felon disenfranchisement further, however, by reasoning
that:
[M]inors, mental defectives, and illiterates are deemed unfit
to vote because they are lacking in the minimal
understanding and judgment necessary to exercise the
franchise. A different rationale must be invoked for
excluding without distinction all persons who have ever
been convicted of 'infamous crimes,' including those who
possess the requisite mental and educational
qualifications."96
To preserve the constitutionality of the statute, though, the court
concluded that disenfranchisement "must be limited to conviction of
crimes involving moral corruption and dishonesty, thereby branding
their perpetrator as a threat to the integrity of the elective process." 97
Likewise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld
Texas's felon disenfranchisement scheme on the grounds that citizens
with felony convictions, "like insane ersons, have raised questions
about their ability to vote responsibly." Those ideas also surfaced in
Ramirez and its doctrinal precursor, Green v. Board of Elections of New
York. The challenge in Green was brought by one of the defendants
convicted of conspiring "to organize the Communist Party as a group to
teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the [United States]
government by force and violence, and to advocate and teach the duty
and necessity of' the same in the well-known case of United States v.
Dennis.99 Gilbert Green unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality
of New York's felon disenfranchisement laws as applied to him. 00 In
defending the laws as a general matter, the Second Circuit forcefully
articulated a subversive-voting rationale:
[I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to
decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part
in electing the legislators who make the laws, the
executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try
them for further violations, or the judges who are to
consider their cases. This is especially so when account is
taken of the heavy incidence of recidivism and prevalence
96. Id.
97. Id. at 414.
98. Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978).
99. Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 447 (2d. Cir. 1967) (citing United
States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), af'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
100. Id. at 452.
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of organized crime. A contention that the [Constitution]
requires [a state] to allow convicted mafiosi to vote for
district attorneys or judges would not only be without merit
but as obviously so as anything can be. '0 '
Furthermore, Justice Marshall's dissent in Ramirez further exposes the
fear of subversive voting that underlies the justifications for felon
disenfranchisement statutes. Justice Marshall surmised that the
California statute at issue resulted from a concern that the "likely voting
pattern [of citizens with criminal convictions who had completed their
sentences] might be subversive of the interests of an orderly society."' 02
Although claims of subversive voting, purity of the ballot box, and
ballot integrity may have intuitive appeal as a matter of civic
republicanism, the censorial nature of these justifications is evident.
Under the civic republican rationale, "former criminals lose the right to
participate because they have shown themselves to lack the virtue on
which the survival of the polis depends. 'Fitness' and 'capability' are
central to this justification [because] political competence, according to
republican theory, has a moral dimension."1o3 Because voting is a right
as well as a public duty, citizens may forfeit the right to vote if they
become unfit in the eyes of society to perform this civic function.
Citizens with criminal convictions are excluded because they are
deemed unable to cast their ballots in accordance with the common
good.104 This rationale is, in effect, a judgment of the propriety of the
voter's thoughts and character based on the criminal conviction. 0 5 At
bottom, the felony conviction serves as a proxy for unpopular or
counter-majoritarian viewpoints, which in turn operate as the basis for
denying the franchise. The theoretical justification for
disenfranchisement, thus, is that "only the virtuous are morally
competent to participate in governing society."'
101. Id. at 451-52 (citation omitted).
102. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 81 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (citing Green, 380 F.2d at 451).
103. Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "The
Purity of the Ballot Box, " 102 HARv. L. REv. 1300, 1307 (1989).
104. See id. at 1301 (arguing that "disenfranchisement is driven .. . by an atavistic and
deep-rooted social need to define the boundaries of the community by stigmatizing some
persons as outsiders").
105. Id. at 1307 ("[I]n contrast to the liberal justification, which emphasizes an ex-
offender's voluntary violation of the social contract, the republican justification for
disenfranchisement rests not upon what a criminal has done, but upon whom he has shown
himself to be.").
106. See id. at 1304.
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Voting restrictions based on character or competence not only run
afoul of the Voting Rights Act's ban on "literacy" and "character" tests
and similar devices-they are a direct affront to First Amendment
principles surrounding equality of ideas and equality of speakers. 1 07
Although the Otsuka court protested that the arguments underlying the
theory of subversive voting "are not fanciful fears," 08 the available
empirical data suggest that these concerns are indeed illusory. As
Justice Marshall instructed in his dissent in Ramirez, "[tihere is
certainly no basis for asserting that ex-felons have any less interest in
the democratic process than any other citizen. Like everyone else, their
daily lives are deeply affected and changed by the decisions of
government." 09 Moreover, to the extent that citizens with felony
convictions vote differently than other citizens, that distinctive
viewpoint counsels toward their inclusion.110
The rhetorical counterargument conjures images of rapists,
murderers, and robbers corrupting the ballot box. Underlying these
fears, however, are many facts that cut against blanket
disenfranchisement for felony convictions. If the underlying purpose of
a felon disenfranchisement statute is purity of the ballot box, then "the
inquiry must focus more precisely on the nature of the crime itself, and
determine whether the elements of the crime are such that he who has
committed it may reasonably be deemed to constitute a threat to the
integrity of the elective process.""' If ballot integrity means the
prevention of election fraud, a more rational proposal is to prohibit the
one percent of inmates incarcerated for election fraud from voting for
fear of their propensity to repeat the offense.112 Indeed, felon
107. The Court has also called into question the propriety of relying on morality as a
legislative motive. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (explicitly rejecting
determinations of morality as a legitimate state interest in supporting legislation).
108. Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 417 (Cal. 1966).
109. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Alec
Ewald, Punishing at the Polls: The Case Against Disenfranchising Citizens with Felony
Convictions, DEMOS 33 (Sept. 2003), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/demos/punishing at
the.polls.pdf (citing research that found that the overwhelming number of persons with felony
convictions "believed that they had done something 'wrong,' that the law they violated
represented a norm that was worthy of respect and that ought to be followed," and that striking
down the laws under which they were convicted would be "a bad thing" because the illegal
behavior the laws prevented would proliferate); Jamie Fellner & Marc Mauer, Losing the Vote:
The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE SENTENCING PROJECT
15 (Oct. 1998), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/File/FVR/fd-losingthevote.pdf ("There is
no reason to believe that all or even most ex-offenders would vote to weaken the content or
administration of criminal laws.").
110. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
I11. Otsuka, 414 P.2d at 422.
112. See Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Mark E. Thompson, Comment,
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disenfranchisement laws are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass
constitutional scrutiny based on these rationales. As one scholar has
noted, "[i]f felon disenfranchisement laws are meant to prevent electoral
fraud, then they are overinclusive [because] they apply across the board
though the vast majority of crimes leading to disenfranchisement are not
related to elections." 11 3
Finally, like other assumptions that underlie felon
disenfranchisement practices, the theory of subversive voting lacks
empirical support and defies common understanding of electoral
behavior. The notion that, if permitted to vote, citizens with felony
convictions might form a criminal-minded faction and influence
criminal justice policies is not only logically unsound and factually
misplaced; it is an impermissible and wholly undemocratic basis for
vote denial because it excludes citizens from the electorate because of
their unpopular views. 114 The First Amendment Equal Protection
approach regards these censorial justifications with suspicion and
requires heightened scrutiny because of the First Amendment equality
norms involved. That approach ensures that the animus for denying the
franchise to citizens with felony convictions is not how their vote might
affect and inform broader public policy because of its content. 15
Don't Do the Crime if You Ever Intend to Vote Again: Challenging the Disenfranchisement of
Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 SETON HALL. L. REv. 167, 191-92 (2002)
(commenting on the illogical nexus between the commission of a felony and the propensity to
commit an election offense); see also Lori Minnite & David Callahan, Securing the Vote: An
Analysis of Election Fraud, MICHIGAN ELECTION REFORM ALLIANCE 4, 17 (2003),
http://www.michiganelectionreformalliance.org/EDRSecuringtheVote.pdf (finding that no
significant threat of voting fraud exists).
113. Figler, supra note 84, at 736 (noting that felon disenfranchisement laws are "also,
ironically, underinclusive, as some states classify election fraud as a misdemeanor and thus do
not disenfranchise the people who do break voting laws"); see also Tanya Dugree-Pearson,
Disenfranchisement-A Race Neutral Punishment for Felony Offenders or a Way to Diminish
the Minority Vote?, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 359, 386 (2002); Eric J. Miller, Foundering
Democracy: Felony Disenfranchisement in the American Tradition of Voter Exclusion, 19
NAT'L BLACK L.J. 32, 37 (2005) ("It bucks common sense, however, to argue that the ballots of
felons or former felons have a different electoral significance than those of misdemeanant[s] or
citizens with no criminal record."); Ewald, supra note 109, at 36.
114. See Michael Dorf, Should Felons Vote?, DoRF ON LAW (Jan. 18, 2012, 1:00 AM)
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/01/should-felons-vote.html ("[If people who want to eliminate
the criminal law so that they can commit violent crimes form a near-majority of the population,
then civilized society is already a lost cause.").
115. Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 358 (1993) ("[lIt
appears that denying ex-felons the right to vote might indeed be based on mistrust of how they
may vote, thus a retreat from the Court's quasi-content neutrality.").
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2. Intelligent Use of the Ballot
The justification of intelligent use of the ballot relates closely to
many of the assumptions underlying subversive voting, purity of the
ballot box, and ballot integrity. However, this theory is distinct from
these other concepts both conceptually and in terms of the judicial
treatment it has received. Conceptually, intelligent use of the ballot is
distinguishable from morality-based arguments because it relates to
ability and capacity rather than judgment and moral fitness. In terms of
its judicial treatment, intelligent use of the ballot has historically faced
challenges before the courts and legislature because it often disguises
less lawful motives.H1 6
In Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections," the Court
first established that competence measures were a legitimate means of
ensuring intelligent use of the ballot and determining entitlement to the
constitutionally protected right to vote."' 8 The State of North Carolina
asserted its interest in ensuring that all voters are intelligent and
informed about current political issues by requiring a literacy test.l 19 On
this basis, the Court held that literacy tests were a constitutionally
permissible means of achieving the end of an informed electorate.120
Literacy tests admittedly bear a rational relationship to the interest in
intelligent use of the ballot. The Harper Court explained the rationale
behind restrictions based on this interest as follows: "[U]nlike a poll tax,
the 'ability to read and write . . . has some relation to standards designed
to promote intelligent use of the ballot."'l21 By contrast, the commission
of (or failure to commit) a crime does not rationally relate to intelligent
use of the ballot, unless the underlying concern is the perspective that
such voters will bring to the ballot. Unlike mental capacity and age
qualifications, felon disenfranchisement laws are not about ability or
competence, but rather are premised on concerns about the qualitative
116. As noted above, Congress imposed a nationwide ban on literacy tests and similar
devices because they were misused as a tool of racial discrimination. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
117. 360 U.S.45 (1959).
118. Id. at 51-53.
119. Id. at 46-47, 51-52.
120. Id. at 53-54. The notion of intelligent use of the ballot raises concerns independent of
its justification for felon disenfranchisement. As a general matter, it views voting and the
function of voting as highly contested and devoid of expressive value. See Winkler, supra note
115, at 347-48 (arguing that the Court's acceptance of literacy tests reflects "an instrumental
power approach to the right to vote: if voting is valuable only to the extent that one can use it to
further one's narrow, informed policy choices, then governments might reasonably limit the
franchise to people with sufficient ability to inform themselves of the issues").
121. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (emphasis added) (quoting
Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51).
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use of the ballot based on the identity of the potential voter. The identity
of citizens with felony convictions is a proxy to limit exercise of the
franchise on grounds that they cannot make intelligent use of the ballot
absent any correlation between their status as felons and the ability to
use the ballot intelligently. 122 Indeed, in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Court
carefully deconstructed the rationale behind intelligent use of the ballot
and noted its potential for abuse in this way.' 23
Dunn involved a Tennessee law that required a one-year residence in
the state and a three-month residence in the county as a precondition for
voting. 124 In determining that there was no practical reason for limiting
the franchise to longer-term residents, the Court noted that recent
migrants to the state who take the time to register and vote shortly after
moving are likely to be citizens "who make it a point to be informed
and knowledgeable about the issues."l 2 5 Moreover, the Court noted that
modem communications technology and increased campaign activity
immediately before elections provided ample opportunities for voter
education. 6 The Court's fact-finding into the context of Tennessee's
residency requirement revealed that it was not narrowly tailored:
Tennessee has never made an attempt to further its alleged
interest in an informed electorate in a universally applicable
way. Knowledge or competence has never been a criterion
for participation in Tennessee's electoral process for
longtime residents. Indeed, the State specifically provides
for voting by various types of absentee persons. These
provisions permit many longtime residents who leave the
county or State to participate in a constituency in which
they have only the slightest political interest, and from
whose political debates they are likely to be cut off. That
the State specifically permits such voting is not consistent
with its claimed compelling interest in intelligent, informed
use of the ballot. If the State seeks to assure intelligent use
of the ballot, it may not try to serve this interest only with
122. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1985) (noting the state's intention
to exclude poor whites from the franchise).
123. 405 U.S. 330, 35460 (1972).
124. Id. at 331, 334.
125. Id. at 358.
126. Id. The Court further dismissed the state's rationale in stating that "the State cannot
seriously maintain that it is 'necessary' to reside for a year in the State and three months in the
county in order to be knowledgeable about congressional, state, or even purely local elections."
Id.
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respect to new arrivals.127
Similarly, if intelligent use of the ballot is the justification for felon
disenfranchisement laws, there are better ways of serving that interest.
Currently, no state employs any tests to determine voters' ability to use
the ballot intelligently. Moreover, the felony convictions that provide
the basis for disenfranchisement do not reveal any information about
individual capacity to use the ballot intelligently. Nearly all citizens
with felony convictions, including those who are incarcerated, have
access to communications and information that would allow them to
form part of an informed electorate. As the Court stated in Dunn, if the
state seeks to assure intelligent use of the ballot, it may not try to serve
this interest only with respect to a certain group of citizens.128
Moreover, to justify such broad exclusion-especially as it concerns the
protected sphere of elections-states must offer a better rationale to
comport with First Amendment principles than Ramirez's implicit
authorization to disenfranchise.
3. Social Contract Theory
Like purity of the ballot box and intelligent use justifications, social
contract theory is a popular rationale for felon disenfranchisement.129
Originated by Thomas Hobbes, social contract theory presupposes that
"a man who breaks the laws he has authorized his agent to make for his
own governance could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the
right to participate in further administering the [social] compact."' In
127. Id. at 358-59 (footnote omitted).
128. Id. at 359.
129. In Green v. Board of Elections of New York, 380 F.2d 445 (1967), Judge Henry
Friendly cited John Locke's social contract theory as a justification for felon
disenfranchisement. Id. at 451.
130. Id. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 109 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett
Publ'g Co. 1994) (1651) ("The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to
defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another ... is to confer all
their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, which is as much to say,
to appoint one man or assembly of men to be their person, and every one to acknowledge
himself to the be the author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act . . . ."); JOHN
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 52-53 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g
Co. 1980) (1690) ("And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic
under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to everyone of that society, to submit
to the determination of the majority ... or else this original compact, whereby he with others
incorporates into one society, would ... be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties
than . .. in the state of nature."); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 60-61
(Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762) (describing the social contract as
consisting of the "unconditional" and "total alienation" of each individual's rights to the "whole
community") ("Immediately, in place of the individual person of each contracting party, [the]
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other words, each citizen has a tacit agreement with her government to
be governed in exchange for the protections of government and the rule
of law. John Locke later expanded the theory to include notions of
deterrence, explaining that "each transgression may be punished to that
degree, and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill
bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from
doing the like."l 31
The social contract justification for felon disenfranchisement can be
termed the "expressive function of exclusion."1 32 This theory casts laws
that deny voting rights based on criminal conviction as a form of
punishment and stigma against those who have transgressed the laws of
society. 133 This punitive notion of "just deserts" undermines the
democratic enterprise, however, by failing to engage those citizens who
are unable or unwilling to abide by the social contract that binds them to
their government and reinforces the government's legitimacy. As a
matter of viewpoint discrimination, social contract theory shuns from
the electorate those individuals who may not subscribe to the compact
with government that social contract theory assumes. For example,
citizens with felony convictions are effectively denied the right to vote
because of their "dissent" from established laws. While this may not be
an outlook that many believe society should value, it should not form
the basis of political exclusion because it is a judgment on the viewpoint
of the potential voter. Moreover, through the enactment and
maintenance of felon disenfranchisement laws intended to exclude a
criminal viewpoint, legislatures intentionally construct an electorate that
it believes is more likely to align with state interests.
Admittedly, of the justifications proffered in defense of felon
disenfranchisement, social contract theory is the most ambiguous and
difficult to link to viewpoint discrimination. Perhaps the most powerful
critique of social contract theory (and the related, historically rooted
concepts of infamia and civil death by which criminals were deemed
dead and stripped of citizenship for purposes of civil rights) is that it is
act of association creates an artificial and corporate body composed of as many members as
there are voters in the assembly, and by this same act that body acquires its unity, its common
ego, its life and its will.").
131. LOCKE, supra note 130, at 12.
132. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, TEACHER'S
MANUAL FOR THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 23 (3d ed.
2003); see also Jessie Allen, Documentary Disenfranchisement, 86 TUL. L. REv. 389, 426 n. 141
(2011); Jason Schall, The Consistency ofFelon Disenfranchisement with Citizenship Theory, 22
HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 53, 91-92 (2006).
133. John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government (1690), in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU 89 (Ernest
Barker ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1962) (1690).
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outmoded and inconsonant with modem concepts of democracy.
Indeed, these theories have never been reconciled with equally
fundamental and constitutionally based norms of freedom of
expression'3 4 or with modem notions of citizenship.' 35
As noted above, this coerced construction of the electorate
delegitimizes the government that results.' 36 Moreover, in the effort to
exclude a criminal viewpoint, another potential viewpoint, which I term
the "canary viewpoint," is excised from the body politic. The canary
viewpoint refers to the miner's canary whose death signals atmospheric
dangers in the mine.'3 7 In the context of felon disenfranchisement, the
canary viewpoint results from the intersectionality of race, crime, and
low socioeconomic status that combine to create the disenfranchised
population.' 38 Random and disparate breaches of the social contract
would suggest individual choice rather than systemic group-based
causes produce this phenomenon.' 39 However, if certain discrete and
concentrated segments of society persistently fail to meet the terms of
the social contract, as the high incarceration rates in the United States
and underlying demographics suggest, this is a signal that there may be
a systemic flaw contributing to this skewed result. If, by contrast, these
failures occurred nearly equally across all segments of society, there
would be less cause for concern.
The canary viewpoint expressed through the electoral process could
signal these atmospheric dangers in our democracy. Instead, however,
134. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 225, 233 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992)
(summarizing this theory's underlying premise) ("Freedom of expression is properly based on
autonomy: the Kantian right of each individual to be treated as an end in himself, an equal
sovereign citizen of the kingdom of ends with a right to the greatest liberty compatible with the
like liberties of all others."); Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2427.
135. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958) ("Citizenship is not a license that
expires upon misbehavior.").
136. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
137. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 12 (2002) ("One might say that the canary is
diagnostic, signaling the need for more systemic critique.").
138. See Debra Parkes, Ballot Boxes Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisonser
Disenfranchisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 71, 76 (2003) ("The reality that
prisoners may have an impact on the outcome of elections is an argument in favour of allowing
them to vote rather than against it."); see also infra Subsection II.D.2.
139. See Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) ("Felons are not
disenfranchised based on any immutable characteristic, such as race, but on their conscious
decision to commit an act for which they assume the risks of detection and punishment."). But
see Note, supra note 103, at 1311 ("To drape disenfranchisement in the language of the social
contract, for example, suggests that the criminal has deliberately chosen to reject and remove
himself from the community. This understanding has two components: first, that criminality is
the product of free choice, and second, that the criminal does not wish to be one of us.").
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these potential voters are denied the right to vote in order to suppress a
supposed criminal viewpoint. Without the benefit of the political
participation of those citizens who have failed to uphold the social
contract, it is more difficult to understand or attract sustained attention
to the root causes of its breach. As a result, democracy functions by
silencing those who might signal its failure. Democratic deliberation is
sanitized and truncated because evidence of societal failure is excluded
from the ballot box. While the collateral exclusion of the canary
viewpoint may not be justiciable, the intentional exclusion of the
perceived criminal viewpoint offends First Amendment and equal
protection principles and can be addressed.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION AND FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Having set forth the theory of viewpoint discrimination in voting and
with respect to felon disenfranchisement laws in particular, this Part
considers how courts might engage a legal claim on this basis. This
Section introduces the theory of First Amendment Equal Protection as a
way to frame and adjudicate a viewpoint discrimination claim under the
Equal Protection Clause. First Amendment Equal Protection examines
the exercise of discretion by official and quasi-official decision makers
in areas where equal protection and freedom of expression may be
compromised. To date, the skepticism that the Court has had toward
excessive discretion in the area of political expression has not informed
courts' analysis of felon disenfranchisement laws or other vote denial
mechanisms. The logic behind First Amendment Equal Protection,
however, should influence the legislatures' discretion in enacting and
enforcing felon disenfranchisement laws and the freedom of expression
that is consequently burdened. Moreover, the growing palatability of
free speech protection in the political arena invites renewed
consideration of felon disenfranchisement laws, and other vote denial
mechanisms, within this context.
A. What Is First Amendment Equal Protection?
First Amendment Equal Protection addresses discretionary
incursions on freedom of expression that violate both clauses' norms of
equality.140 At its core, First Amendment Equal Protection enforces the
ideal "that all citizens should have an equal opportunity to participate in
140. As Professor Kenneth Karst has observed, "the principle of equal liberty lies at the
heart of the first amendment's protections against government regulation of the content of
speech." Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. C.
L. REv. 20, 21 (1975) [hereinafter Karst, Equality in the First Amendment].
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public discourse."1 41 First Amendment Equal Protection is largely
concerned with abuse of discretion by official and unofficial decision
makers that results in a violation of equality norms.142 In practice, First
Amendment Equal Protection requires courts to be equally intolerant of
discretion in the realm of political participation as they are in the realm
of freedom of expression, based upon the suspicion that discretion can
mask intentional discrimination. In this regard, First Amendment Equal
Protection allows courts to undertake a more robust analysis to
determine whether discriminatory motives are at play.14 3
Rather than treat constitutional doctrines as hermetically sealed from
one another, the Supreme Court has invited-and in some instances
unwittingly instigated-the cross-pollination of legal theories and
doctrines. First Amendment Equal Protection is one such example. First
Amendment Equal Protection is a theory founded on the First
Amendment and equal protection doctrines' coherence in protecting
against discretionary incursions on freedom of expression that violate
norms of equality. To be clear, First Amendment Equal Protection is not
a First Amendment claim. Rather, rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment,
First Amendment Equal Protection is a discrete dimension of equal
protection jurisprudence informed by First Amendment principles. It
describes the Court's treatment of official discretion under the Equal
Protection Clause on matters involving speech or expression. First
Amendment Equal Protection does not expand the First Amendment's
scope; instead, it enlarges the qualitative considerations for enforcing
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The phrase "First Amendment Equal Protection", coined by
Professor Daniel Tokaji, echoes Professor Henry Monaghan's theory of
"First Amendment Due Process." 4 5 First Amendment Due Process
refers to the Supreme Court's development of distinct procedural
safeguards to protect freedom of expression and is distinguishable from
First Amendment Equal Protection by the latter's focus on the
141. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2410.
142. See id. at 2414-21.
143. Notably, First Amendment Equal Protection as it applies to felon disenfranchisement
is not predicated upon including the right to vote within the ambit of First Amendment
protections. See id. at 2498 ("Acceptance of the First Amendment Equal Protection approach to
political equality does not require belief that the vote itself falls within the scope of the First
Amendment.").
144. Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925, 960 n.85
(2007).
145. See Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2410 n.7 ("The use
of [First Amendment Equal Protection] is meant to recall Professor Monaghan's use of the term
First Amendment 'Due Process' in his article of the same title." (citing Henry P. Monaghan,
First Amendment "Due Process, " 83 HARv. L. REV. 518 (1970))).
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substantive equality principle of the First Amendment. First
Amendment Due Process differs further because it involves actual First
Amendment claims, whereas First Amendment Equal Protection
operates as a dimension of equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The theories share, however, the overarching principle that
political speech or expression requires heightened judicial protection.146
Importantly, neither theory has been accepted (or rejected) by the
Supreme Court. Instead, First Amendment Equal Protection represents a
typology of the Court's analyses in a distinct body of cases. 147
The heart of First Amendment Equal Protection executes the value
that every citizen should have an equal chance to participate in public
dialogue. 48 In doing so, "[i]t takes up Kenneth Karst's insight that 'the
principle of equal liberty lies at the heart of the first amendment's
protections against government regulation of the content of speech."'l
49
It also furthers Dean Robert Post's instruction that "[e]quality of speech
derives from an equality of speakers."',5 0 As a substantive matter, the
theory of First Amendment Equal Protection derives from civil rights
era cases where the Equal Protection Clause was used to protect and
secure First Amendment rights to unpopular expression.' 5 ' It also
derives from certain First Amendment cases in which vague and
incoherent standards permitted officials to deny access to public fora
"based on [officials'] hostility [toward] particular viewpoints."' 52 Like
the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment is foremost
146. See Monaghan, supra note 145, at 524 ("[W]hen the subject matter of speech is
political in character .. ., the need for a disinterested judicial judgment is even greater.").
147. See infra Section I.B.
148. See Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12.
149. Id. at 2410 n.7 (citing Karst, Equality in the First Amendment, supra note 140, at 21).
This is consistent with Professor Karst's definition of equal citizenship, whereby the Fourteenth
Amendment confers a right to every citizen "to be treated as a respected and responsible
participant in community public life." Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens:
Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REv. 99, 102 (2007).
150. Post, supra note 36, at 484-85 ("The equality of status of ideas within public
discourse follows directly from the equality of political status of citizens who attempt to make
government responsive to their views.").
151. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) ("The Equal
Protection Clause requires that statutes affecting First Amendment interests be narrowly tailored
to their legitimate objectives." (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), and Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972))).
152. See Foley, supra note 144, at 960-61. The abuse of discretion is often aided by vague
legal standards that camouflage discriminatory intentions. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal
Protection, supra note 12, at 2441. As a result, "[a]bsent clearly defined rules that limit official
decisionmakers' discretion, discrimination against unpopular speech may escape detection." Id.
at 2430.
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concerned with improper government motive. 153 The synthesis of these
interests, along with both clauses' pursuit of equality, gives rise to the
theory of First Amendment Equal Protection.' 54
Because discretion can conceal intentional discrimination, under the
theory of First Amendment Equal Protection, courts must be as wary of
discretion in the sphere of political participation as they are in the
sphere of freedom of expression. Importantly, First Amendment Equal
Protection does not rely exclusively on discretion as a trigger for the
conjoined application of First Amendment and equal protection
principles; rather, it is the core nature of expressive activity itself that
commands the dual protection of these muscular constitutional
provisions.
Thus, First Amendment Equal Protection leads to a more robust
undertaking of equality claims under the Fourteenth Amendment that is
informed by the First Amendment to determine whether discriminatory
motives are at play. To that end, First Amendment Equal Protection
embodies four ideals: (1) the requirement of clear standards, (2)
broadened justiciability, (3) leniency toward facial challenges, and (4)
increased judicial fact-finding. 55 These ideals comprise both procedural
and substantive variations from conventional equal protection. Clear
standards limit the exercise of discretion that can mask
discrimination.156 Broad justiciability allows courts to entertain cases by
relaxing standing requirements in order to increase enforcement against
rights violations. 157 Leniency toward facial challenges permits litigants
to challenge suspect laws directly before harm or injury occurs. 58
Finally, increased judicial fact-finding enables courts to consider
context in investigating specific constitutional violations and their
underlying motivations.
Without identifying it as such, the Court has employed First
Amendment Equal Protection in certain categories of cases involving
freedom of expression. For example, the Court's inherent distrust of
official discretion in the speech context "animates [many] public fora,
censorship, and civil rights era cases."1 60 In these cases, the Court
153. Kagan, supra note 6, at 414 ("[T]he application of First Amendment law is best
understood and most readily explained as a kind of motive-hunting.").
154. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2441.
155. Id. at 2430.
156. Id. at 2442.
157. Id. at 2447.
158. Id. at 2446-47.
159. Id. at 2447.
160. The Court was animated in these cases by a suspicion of racial bias or viewpoint
discrimination. See id. at 2441 ("For the most part, these cases arise in contexts where the Court
smelled a rat-that is, where circumstances suggested that discrimination against disfavored
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employs an especially searching mode of analysis that involves relaxed
standards of justiciability, facial challenges, and increased judicial fact-
finding when faced with official discretion that potentially masks
discrimination in the realm of expression.1 6 '
B. First Amendment Equal Protection at Work
First Amendment Equal Protection reveals itself in particular
categories of equal protection cases whose outcomes cannot be
explained by traditional equal protection analysis. These are cases in
which the Court departed from the norm of requiring evidence of facial
or intentional discrimination to substantiate an equal protection
violation. 162 Importantly, many of these cases involve rights of political
participation. The cases are grouped into the following cateqories: jury
selection; political restructuring; and one person, one vote. Despite
the Court's silence regarding its rationale, however, the collective
narrative of the cases situates them comfortably within First
Amendment Equal Protection theory and provides a guidepost for other
challenges in the realm of political participation, especially where racial
disparities loom.164  Moreover, while each grouping of cases is
instructive concerning the potential application of First Amendment
viewpoints or certain speakers was at play, but where that discrimination was difficult to
substantiate.").
161. First Amendment Equal Protection may also be characterized as a version of what
Frederick Schauer and Richard Pildes termed "electoral exceptionalism." Schauer & Pildes,
supra note 18, at 1805. Electoral exceptionalism defines elections as bounded domains for
purposes of constitutional scrutiny. This theoretical circumscription of elections for regulation
purposes enables a distinct application of First Amendment principles that is particular to the
electoral context and the highly protected speech within that domain, whether or not that
application falls squarely within the First Amendment's scope. See id. ("According to electoral
exceptionalism, elections should be constitutionally understood as (relatively) bounded domains
of communicative activity. Because of the defined scope of this activity, it would be possible to
prescribe or apply First Amendment principles to electoral processes that do not necessarily
apply through the full reach of the First Amendment.").
162. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv.
1105, 1127 (1989) ("[T]he voting cases appear to require only a showing of disparate impact
plus a showing that the jurisdiction has engaged in other types of discrimination in the past.");
see also Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2467-86 (categorizing
this grouping of cases under the heading "Unconventional Equal Protection" and suggesting that
these decisions "share a willingness to find an equal protection violation on something less than
the ordinary showing of discriminatory intent").
163. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2412 (categorizing three
areas of equal protection jurisprudence in which the Court has been willing to find an equal
protection violation based on unequality of democratic participation).
164. Id. at 2467 ("[T]he approach that the Court has taken in each of these areas can be
understood as motivated by concerns similar to those which underlie the First Amendment
Equal Protection cases."),
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Equal Protection to future vote denial challenges such as felon
disenfranchisement, the one person, one vote and political restructuring
cases are most pertinent.
1. One Person, One Vote Cases
One person, one vote cases are premised on a principle of equality.
In short, they hold that the value of each citizen's vote should be equal
to that of any other citizen's. While one person, one vote cases were not
race-based challenges per se, they arose out of a context of wholesale
discrimination against African-Americans in which states refused to
participate in congressional reapportionment because it would
potentially strengthen African-American political power in light of
substantial population changes.' 65 Although the Court was at first loath
to "enter this political thicket,"'66 over time it pruned from the American
electoral system a host of practices designed to discriminate against
African-Americans in the electoral arena, including vintage vote-denial
practices such as grandfather clauses,'167 literacy and character tests,168
the poll tax,169 the all-white primary, 170 and discriminatory failure to
reapportion.171 These practices were struck down largely because the
165. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903) (affirming the denial of equitable
relief to black citizens who were unlawfully denied the right to vote).
166. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (holding that courts should not "enter
this political thicket" of malapportionment under the "political question" doctrine); see also
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963) (holding that a "county unit" vote count system
that weighted votes cast in rural counties more heavily than those cast in urban counties was
unconstitutional).
167. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 354 (1915) (holding that the grandfather clause
in question "unlawfully, willfully and fraudulently [deprived] certain negro citizens, on account
of their race and color, of a right to vote at a general election").
168. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1965) (describing how Louisiana's
"interpretation test" required voters to interpret a section of the state or federal Constitution to
the satisfaction of the registrar prior to voting). Literacy tests were not banned by the Court, but
are prohibited statutorily under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 if applied "to deny or abridge the
right .. . to vote on account of race or color." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6 (1965).
169. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) ("We conclude that a State
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.").
170. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (plurality opinion) (holding that the white-
only primary restricted the right to vote on the basis of race and color); id. at 484 (Clark, J.,
concurring) ("[Blecause the [white]-indorsed nominee meets no opposition in the Democratic
primary, the Negro minority's vote is nullified at the sole stage of the local political process
where the bargaining and interplay of rival political forces would make it count."); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (overturning a Texas statute that discriminated "by the
distinction of color alone").
171. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that state legislative seats "must
be apportioned on a population basis").
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65146
FIRSTAMENDMENT, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
vast discretion that officials possessed in administering elections served
to hide racial discrimination and bias. In this way, the one person, one
vote cases "serve as a prophylactic against decisionmakers acting based
on venal motives,"l 72 and they share concerns of excessive discretion
and unclear standards with First Amendment Equal Protection theory.' 73
2. Political Restructuring Cases
Another body of cases that illustrates First Amendment Equal
Protection and its application in the electoral arena involves political-
structural issues such as at-large voting systems and racial
gerrymandering, the latter of which submerges minority interests.
Political-restructuring cases concern political systems that burden the
ability of certain groups to achieve greater political equality through
participating in the political process. Like one person, one vote cases, in
political-restructuring cases the Court does not require the traditional or
conventional showing of intentional or facial discrimination to find an
equal protection violation. Instead, in cases such as Hunter v.
Erickson,17 4 Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,175 and Romer
v. Evans, 176 the Court held that laws imposing unequal burdens on
certain groups to participate in the political process are unconstitutional.
3. Vote-Denial Cases
First Amendment Equal Protection can also be traced to vote-denial
contexts. In Hunter v. Underwood,'7 7 the Court rejected the argument
that a nondiscriminatory justification for felon disenfranchisement laws
172. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2483-84.
173. Id. at 2483 ("[One person, one vote cases] arise from a concern that without clear
rules by which to cabin official discretion over the electoral process, discrimination against
politically disfavored groups might otherwise escape detection."). The abuse of discretion
surrounding these practices is well-known and does not bear repeating here. It is sufficient to
state that officials vested with the discretion to determine whether prospective voters have
adequately interpreted a provision of the Constitution, are sufficiently literate, or should pay a
poll tax in order to vote have virtually unchecked authority to exercise that discretion
discriminatorily. See id, at 2483-87, for an analysis of one person, one vote cases. The Court's
imposition of the one person, one vote standard, as well as its ban of specific vote-denial
practices, eliminated the vast majority of this sort of discretion in the electoral arena. See, e.g.,
id. at 2485 ("The one-person, one-vote rule promotes uniformity, consistency, fairness, and
neutrality in decisions about apportionment by limiting judicial discretion to one simple
question: Do all districts have the same number of residents?" (quoting Spencer Overton, Rules,
Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law ofDemocracy, 37 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 65,
79 (2002))).
174. 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969).
175. 458 U.S. 457, 486-87 (1982).
176. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
177. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
2013] 147
could outweigh evidence of discriminatory intent. Most important,
however, is Hunter's reliance on the seminal First Amendment case
United States v. O'Brien to underscore the difficulty in determining
legislative motive.179 The Court ultimately determined that the
difficulties in O'Brien did not matter in Hunter because of the strong
evidence of discriminatory intent.
In addition, some scholars have argued different variations of the
theory that Bush v. Gore extended the First Amendment Equal
Protection precedent to the voting process.' 80 They suggest that the
Court surreptitiously and, perhaps, unintentionally relied on First
Amendment doctrine in holding that, for want of clear standards, the
Florida ballot recount during the 2000 presidential election violated
equal protection.' 8 Bush v. Gore does indeed appear to incorporate the
four constituent principles of First Amendment Equal Protection: (1) the
precision requirement, (2) liberal rules of justiciability, (3) receptivity to
facial challenges, and (4) independent examination of the evidence.
However, in the aforementioned cases, the Court did not expressly
rely on First Amendment principles as a legal rationale for the remedies
it imposed, but instead, the Court's "recognition of the dangers to
expressive equality posed by official and quasi-official racial bias is
implicit in these decisions."' 82 The cases are unconventional within
equal protection jurisprudence because they join seemingly divergent
doctrines of discretion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
respectively. Indeed, First Amendment Equal Protection resolves "the
discordant doctrines of discretion that predominate under the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause,"183 whereby official
discretion in the realm of speech is suspect and official discretion in the
realm of equal protection is presumptively benign.
C. First Amendment Equal Protection and Viewpoint Discrimination
The synergy between the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause is firmly rooted in the early development of viewpoint
178. Id. at 232-33 ("[A]n additional purpose to discriminate against poor whites would not
render nugatory the purpose to discriminate against all blacks . . . .").
179. Id. at 228 ("'Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous
matter."' (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968))).
180. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion,
Disenfranchisement, and the Help American Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1206, 1249
(2005) [hereinafter Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform]; Tokaji, First Amendment Equal
Protection, supra note 9, at 2487.
181. See Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform, supra note 180.
182. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2441.
183. See id. at 2496.
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discrimination jurisprudence.' 84 Beginning with its decision in Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, the Court treated content-based
restrictions as discrimination in the mode of equal protection
analyses. In Mosley, the Court considered Chicago's restriction on
picketing near a school during school hours under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and held that the statute's exemption of labor
picketing was impermissible viewpoint discrimination.E6 For seven
months prior to the enactment of the statute, the plaintiff in Mosley
peacefully occupied a public sidewalk adjoining the school, carrying a
sign that read: "Jones High School practices black discrimination. Jones
High School has a black quota."' 87
In invalidating the statute, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for a
unanimous Court and acknowledged that the equal protection and First
Amendment claims in the case were "closely intertwined" because the
regulation involved expressive conduct and classifications based on
subject matter. Drawing upon the equal protection doctrine, he
reasoned that "[a]s in all equal protection cases . . . the crucial question
is whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably
furthered by the differential treatment." " Further, the Court expressly
referenced the intersectionality of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and acknowledged the relevance of both constitutional provisions to a
healthy democratic sphere and individual liberty:
To permit the continued building of our politics and
culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual,
our people are guaranteed the right to express any
thought, free from government censorship. The essence
of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any
restriction on expressive activity because of its content
would completely undercut the "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 90
184. See John A. Humbach, Teens, Porn, and Video Games: Is It Time to Rethink
Ginsberg?, AMICUS-ONLINE COMPANION To HARv. C. R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 8 n.48 (2010) (citing
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) and Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
119, 126 (1989)), http://harvardcrcl.org/2010/10/30/teens-porn-and-video-games-is-it-time-to-
rethink-ginsberg/.
185. See id.
186. See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
187. Id. at93.
188. Id. at 95.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 95-96 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
1492013]
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
Post-Mosley, the Court adopted a heightened scrutiny approach to
content-based restrictions on expressive activity, requiring that "the
legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests," and
stating that "the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must
be carefully scrutinized.""' Mosley demonstrates that the Court has
already recognized the intersectionality of equal protection doctrine and
First Amendment protections.192 Vote-denial claims simply require that
the heightened scrutiny and judicial vigilance achieved in viewpoint
discrimination be applied as forcefully as when they concern
infringements on expression in the political arena.
The question then becomes why conventional equal protection
doctrine is not enough. The answer is not that First Amendment Equal
Protection will always yield a different result. Rather, "[t]he critical
distinction between First Amendment Equal Protection and
Conventional Equal Protection lies not so much in how they answer the
theoretical question of what constitutes a violation. The difference lies
instead in their answer to the question of how to prevent and remedy
such violations."' 93 Setting aside the propriety of the Court's decision
that the Equal Protection Clause applies only to intentional racial
discrimination and such discrimination cannot be proved solely by
evidence of disparate impact,' 9 4 a question remains as to how
intentional discrimination can be proved when there is no proverbial
smoking gun but the disparate results are palpable.' 95
On the equal protection side, the Court has not taken up a rigorous
qualitative assessment of official conduct in the area of political
expression to identify intentional discrimination that may occur below
the radar. 196 Although Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.'9 articulated certain factors that can give rise to a
finding of intentional racial discrimination, it provided little guidance
on the qualitative assessment courts should perform when both First
Amendment and equal protection interests are at stake or when the
191. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980).
192. See also infra Section II.B.
193. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2412.
194. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
195. See Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2455 ("Stating that
the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition extends only to intentional discrimination ... raises as
many questions as it answers.").
196. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); see also
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Proof of Discriminatory Intent, 91 HARV. L. REV. 163, 168
(1977) (suggesting the limited applicability of Arlington Heights beyond limited, routine
contexts).
197. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68.
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allegation of discrimination is not primarily racial in nature. 198 First
Amendment Equal Protection, however, calls into doubt discretion
applied to expressive conduct, particularly where there are racially
disparate results. The constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement laws
is more appropriately evaluated through First Amendment Equal
Protection than through traditional Equal Protection analysis because of
the expressive conduct involved.199
D. The First Amendment Equal Protection Claim for Felon
Disenfranchisement
Historically, states often crafted felon disenfranchisement laws with
a racially discriminatory motive.200 Today, on the other hand, most
felon disenfranchisement statutes have no evidence of racial animus in
their enactment. However, by foregrounding First Amendment equality
concerns about viewpoint neutrality and Equal Protection Clause
concerns about fundamental rights, First Amendment Equal Protection
introduces an alternative theory for challenging these race-neutral laws.
198. See id.; see also Julia Kobick, Note, Discriminatory Intent Reconsidered: Folk
Concepts of Intentionality and Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
517, 561 (2010) (discussing the stagnant nature of equal protection jurisprudence). Arlington
Heights established a burden-shifting scheme in cases where a state action or policy is
challenged as racially discriminatory. 429 U.S. at 266. It held that a plaintiff seeking to establish
a prima facie case of an equal protection violation must first show-through use of
disproportionate impact, legislative history, a pattern of events, or departures from usual
procedures-that discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision. Id. The burden then
shifts to the government to show that the same decision would have resulted even if the
discriminatory motive did not exist. Id. at 268. This standard requires a palpable showing of
discriminatory intent or motive that will not be intuited from statistical evidence alone, no
matter how compelling. Id. at 269-70.
199. See Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 2411 (comparing
Washington v. Davis and McCleskey v. Kemp with viewpoint discrimination cases such as
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham for the proposition that the Court presumes decision makers will
generally exercise discretion in a non-racially discriminatory manner despite evidence of a
statistically significant disparate impact on particular racial or ethnic groups but does not
presume non-discrimination in the context of viewpoint restrictions). The apparent difference
between the cases involving political expression and ones such as Washington and McCleskey is
that "the Court exhibits a much greater willingness to trust government decisionmakers-to
assume that they will exercise their discretion in a fair and unbiased manner-where race is
concerned, than where speech is concerned." Id.
200. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 62-63, 162 (2000).
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1. Felon Disenfranchisement as Viewpoint Discrimination: The General
Claim
In lieu of taking up the felon disenfranchisement laws of a specific
state, this Section sets forth a generalized First Amendment Equal
Protection claim for viewpoint discrimination. First Amendment Equal
Protection theory requires the Court to approach states' discretion in
enacting felon disenfranchisement laws with suspicion in light of the
dual nature of the rights implicated-the fundamental right to vote and
the right to freedom of expression absent viewpoint discrimination. To
trigger First Amendment Equal Protection, the regulation at issue must
affect a speech interest and yield a disparate impact. In the case of felon
disenfranchisement, the speech is political expression in the form of
voting and the disparate impact is based on the suspect classification of
race. Once this threshold is met, First Amendment Equal Protection
imposes a burden-shifting scheme and heightened scrutiny. The
suspicion of state action inherent in First Amendment Equal Protection
requires that the burden shift to the state to defend the constitutionality
of the regulation under strict scrutiny. That is, the state must show that
the voting regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest. Unlike conventional equal protection
jurisprudence, where the plaintiff must show that discrimination was a
motivating factor in the government's decision to enact, enforce, or
maintain the laws, First Amendment Equal Protection asks the state to
defend those laws that facially infringe on equality principles.
First Amendment Equal Protection would prohibit a government
interest rooted in viewpoint discrimination because it contravenes the
equality principles of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.20' States
would have to identify, on viewpoint neutral grounds, a constitutional
basis for denying the franchise to citizens with felony convictions.
Although the hallmarks of First Amendment Equal Protection are
(1) clear standards, (2) broadened justiciability, (3) leniency toward
facial challenges, and (4) increased judicial fact-finding, felon
disenfranchisement laws are generally characterized by clear standards
and do not involve discretion in enforcement by election officials and
administrators. Judicial suspicion of these laws must, therefore, derive
from other indicia of improper motive such as disproportionate impact.
Further, First Amendment Equal Protection does not question whether
the authority to exercise discretion exists. Instead, it accepts for
purposes of argument that states' authority to disenfranchise citizens
201. A determination of motive in this context recognizes that "[tihe key principle with
respect to motive is that the government may not limit speech on grounds of mere disapproval,
no matter whose or how widely shared." Kagan, supra note 6, at 430.
[Vol. 65152 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
FIRSTAMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION, AND FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
with felony convictions is constitutionally sanctioned. However, the
broad justiciability afforded such claims under First Amendment Equal
Protection allows courts to adjudicate these claims because of the
exigency of the speech interests at stake.
2. Meeting the Threshold: Speech Interests and Disparate Impact
As noted above, the threshold showing to trigger First Amendment
Equal Protection in the vote denial context is a speech interest and
disparate impact. The speech interest in voting is set forth in Section
III.A of this Article. The disparate impact of felon disenfranchisement,
by definition, falls upon citizens with felony convictions as a class that
does not have constitutionally protected status. However, there are other
aspects of the disparate impact of felon disenfranchisement that
underscore the equality rights at stake. The racially disparate impact of
felon disenfranchisement is well-documented; certain data, however,
bear repeating here to illustrate its multidimensional impact not only in
terms of race, but also in terms of class and partisanship.
Lying at the intersection of two historically discriminatory
systems-penal and electoral-felon disenfranchisement excludes
approximately 5.85 million citizens from the electorate. United States
prisons and jails currently hold 2.4 million inmates, or one in every 100
202
adults. As a result of these combined factors, the United States boasts
the highest incarceration rate of any modem democratic nation.20 The
202. The criminal profile of the prison population reveals that 20% of all state inmates are
incarcerated for drug offenses. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT (2011), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd bs fd
lawsinusAug20l2.pdf ) [hereinafter THE SENTENCING PROJECT]; see Ilyana Kuziemko &
Steven D. Levitt, An Empirical Analysis of Imprisoning Drug Offenders, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2043,
2051 (2004). Moreover, nearly half of all convictions (federal and state) are for nonviolent
offenses. THE SENTENCING PROJECT; see THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES
AT THE MILLENNIUM 1, 3 (2000), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/00-
05-rep_punishingdecade-ac.pdf (indicating that 1,169,118 of the 2,042,479 Americans
incarcerated in 2001 were convicted of non-violent offenses).
203. KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD
PRISON BRIEF, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). The
United States leads the world in the gross number of people incarcerated and the number of
inmates per capita. The United States is the only country that imprisons more than one percent
of its adult population. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA
2008 5 (2008). Indeed, overcrowding is a chronic issue in U.S. prisons, with certain cases
warranting court intervention. Recently, pursuant to the Prison Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, a
three-judge panel ordered the release of thousands of prisoners from California's overcrowded
prison system. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, United States District Court Composed Of
Three Judges Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. 2284, No. CO1-1351 TEH (Aug. 4, 2009). The Supreme




racial disparities in the penal system are just as stark. Of the 7.3 million
persons in correctional facilities,204 or one in thirty-two adults, a
staggering 46% are African-American males, who make up only 7%
percent of the general population. Twenty percent are Latinos (male and
female combined) who comprise 16% of the general population. 205 Of
the prison population itself, blacks total approximately 38%, while
making up only 13% of the general population. 206 Latinos are now the
majority of all sentenced federal felony offenders, comprising 50.4% of
this population, while blacks comprise 19.8% and whites 26.3%.207
Disproportionate disenfranchisement occurs when these skewed
prison statistics confront race- and class-neutral felon
disenfranchisement laws. The general impact of these laws
disenfranchises one in forty Americans.208 Most of the 5.85 million
disenfranchised are not in prison and are either on parole, on probation,
or permanently banned from voting because of a felony conviction. Like
the racially skewed imprisonment numbers, felon disenfranchisement
also has a disparate impact in terms of race, class, and partisanship,
creating a disenfranchised population that is overwhelmingly minority,
poor, and Democrat. 209 Although state justifications may be based on a
suspicion of an immoral, criminal viewpoint, First Amendment Equal
Protection instructs that courts should be suspicious of such rationales if
they potentially mask motivations such as racial discrimination.
Motivations of class or partisanship may not compel the same scrutiny
but help to further contextualize felon disenfranchisement's impact.
a. Race
In addition to the disparate racial impact set forth above, "in 14
states, more than 1 in 10 African Americans have lost the right to vote
by virtue of a felony conviction, and 5 of these states disqualify over 20
204. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, KEY FACTS AT A GLANCE: CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS (Mar. 9, 2012), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/corr2tab.cfn.
205. Id.
206. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 202.
207. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 44 (2011) (reflecting
statistics for the first nine fiscal years. Increased immigration prosecutions explain most of the
increase in the number of Latinos sent to prison over the last decade).
208. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 202.
209. Of that 5.85 million, almost 1.5 million are African-American men, while African-
American men comprise only 13% of the overall population. Over 2 million white Americans
are disenfranchised. Over 560,000 of the disenfranchised are veterans. One million are persons
who have completed their sentences and are living largely in poor, densely populated, urban
communities in various pockets of the country. See The Voting Rights, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=133 (last visited March 9,
2012).
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percent of the African American voting age population." 210 The impact
in local communities is even more acute. For example, one in eight
males in Georgia (one in seven in Atlanta) are disenfranchised because
of a felony conviction. 2 11 Not readily quantifiable is the effect of
disenfranchisement as a community contagion-that is, the culture of
political disenfranchisement and exclusion that occurs by virtue of
living in households or communities with a large, concentrated
population of disenfranchised persons. 212 Like the one person, one vote
cases, felon disenfranchisement is compelling as a First Amendment
Equal Protection issue because it also functions as a group-based
213harm. By internalizing and importing societal divisions into the
democratic process of voting, felon disenfranchisement laws exacerbate
and perpetuate these divisions and contribute to a cycle of community
or group disenfranchisement. 2 14
As a result, individuals who have no affiliation with the penal system
pay the costs of felon disenfranchisement in the currency of political
power. In short, Jim Crow laws and overt, racially discriminatory vote-
denial practices have been replaced with mass incarceration; deepening
class divisions; and race neutral felon disenfranchisement and other
voting qualification laws. In the end, the complexion of the
disenfranchised has changed little since the era of Jim Crow.
210. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 2, at 79.
211. Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, The Vanishing Black Electorate: Felony
Disenfranchisement in Atlanta, Georgia, The Sentencing Project 3 (2004)
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd-vanishingblackelectorate.pdf.
212. TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: How MASS INCARCERATION MAKES
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 5-6, 113-14 (2007); see also Daniel Horn, Felon
Disenfranchisement as an Economic Threat: Class Warfare Revisited, 49-50 (on file with
author).
213. As Professor Owen Fiss has long espoused, the central concern of the Equal
Protection Clause is group subordination. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 123-24 (1976); see also Symposium, The Origins and Fate of
Antisubordination Theory: A Symposium on Owen Fiss's Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2002) (symposia of articles analyzing Professor Fiss's
article).
214. See, e.g., Dugree-Pearson, supra note 113, at 371-77. Professor Michelle Alexander's
twenty first century descriptive account of the intergenerational effects of both race based and
race neutral disfranchisement illuminates this point: "Jarvious Cotton cannot vote. Like his
father, grandfather, great-grandfather, and great-great-grandfather, he has been denied the right
to participate in our electoral democracy. Cotton's family tree tells the story of several
generations of black men who were born in the United States but who were denied the most
basic freedom that democracy promises-the freedom to vote for those who will make the rules
and laws that govern one's life." MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS




The disparate impact of felon disenfranchisement is not just based on
race; there are palpable class dimensions to the American carceral state.
The prison population does not represent a socioeconomic cross section
of the general population. Studies conducted in the 1990s at the
University of Georgia showed that the majority of Georgia's state
prisoners had incomes under the poverty level at the time of
incarceration. 2 15 Moreover, the data showed that income had a
significant correlation with sentence length.216 Offenders with incomes
of less than $5,000 were sentenced most harshly.2 17 That group received
sentences 6.2 months longer than people who had incomes between
$25,000 and $35,000.218 More recent data show that, in terms of
educational attainment, roughly two-thirds of all inmates do not have a
high school diploma or have only a GED.2 19 Having no high school
diploma correlated with an additional sentence of 1.2 months.
The intersection of race and class makes the class implications of
felon disenfranchisement increasingly relevant. There is high
correlation between being black and being poorly educated and in
prison. In 2008, 37% of black males aged twenty to thirty-four with no
high school diploma or GED were incarcerated, compared to 12% of
whites and 7% of Hispanics of the same age and educational status. 22'
To the extent that society relies on the political process and not the
judiciary to regulate economic inequality, it is imperative that all
stakeholders be permitted to participate in the political process.222
215. See generally David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic and Gender Disparities in
Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & EcoN. 285 (2001).
216. Id. at 301.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 295. GED stands for General Education Development. One can obtain a GED
after passing a qualifying examination and without completing the high school curriculum.
http://cms.oregon.gov/ccwd/GED/PDF/GEDFAQ.pdf. GED can also stand for "general
equivalency diploma." THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 301 (11th ed. 2004).
220. Id. at 301.
221. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION'S EFFECT ON
ECONOMIC MOBILITY 8 (2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/EconomicMobility/Collateral%20Costs%2OFINAL.pdfn=5996pro
d/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf. In addition, black male unemployment rates are twice that of white
males'. CHRISTIAN E. WELLER & JARYN FIELDS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE BLACK AND
WHITE LABOR GAP IN AMERICA: WHY AFRICAN AMERICANS STRUGGLE TO FIND JOBS AND
REMAIN EMPLOYED COMPARED TO WHITES Am. 3 (2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2011/07/pdf/black-unemployment.pdf.
222. Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due Process in State
Farm, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1035, 1035-36 (2008) ("In the standard theory, the quintessential
function of the political process is to balance or reconcile competing economic interests.").
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Indeed, "[t]he prevailing assumption is that economic interests are
highly amenable to pluralistic bargaining and majority rule, since
economic losers in one deal can readily regroup and re-negotiate to
defend their interests another day or in another deal."223 However, when
"economic losers" are denied the right to vote, this theory is troubled
and the political process cannot be relied upon to address economic
inequalities.
c. Partisanship
Finally, in examining the impact of felon disenfranchisement, the
interconnection of race, poverty, and partisanship must also be taken
into account. The demographics of the disenfranchised population
correlate highly with Democratic Party affiliation. Studies of the impact
of re-enfranchisement on electoral outcomes demonstrate that the
Democratic Party's successes (and failures) can hinge on the degree of
felon disenfranchisement in a given election. For example, Professors
Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza predicted that the Democrats would
have gained parity in the U.S. Senate in 1984 and would have
maintained control of the Senate from 1986 to 2002, when their study
concluded.224 In addition, they predicted that current felon
disenfranchisement rates would have jeopardized John F. Kennedy's
election in 1960.225 Moreover, in the 2000 presidential election,
President George W. Bush won by 536 Floridian votes. Absent
Florida's strict felon disenfranchisement laws, Vice President Al Gore
would have won the presidency with roughly 60,000 additional votes in
Florida. Although a majority of the Court has maintained that excessive
226partisanship in gerrymandering is justiciable, it has yet to adjudicate a
case where partisan influence rose to the level of unconstitutionality.
Nonetheless, here-where the law at issue is a voting qualification-the
disparate partisan impact should also be justiciable.
3. Compelling Government Interest
Once a plaintiff asserts a speech interest and demonstrates disparate
impact with respect to the voting qualification, First Amendment Equal
Protection requires the court to apply strict scrutiny to determine the
223. Id.
224. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences
of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REv. 777, 792, 794 (2002)
("[W]e estimate that the Democratic Party would have gained parity in 1984 and held majority
control of the U.S. Senate from 1986 to the present.").
225. Id. at 792; see also Brian Pinaire et al., Barred from the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward
the Disenfranchisement ofFelons, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1519, 1520 (2003).
226. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281, 305 (2004).
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law's constitutionality. Accordingly, the state must provide a
compelling government interest in the law that is viewpoint neutral and
it must demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored. As set forth in
Section I.C, the common justifications are insufficient, as they
constitute impermissible viewpoint discrimination. However, this
Article does not purport to exhaust all justifications for felon
disenfranchisement or deal with the issue of narrow tailoring. Nor does
it need to.227 To the extent that a felon disenfranchisement statute is
227. Although rationales for felon disenfranchisement that are unrelated to how citizens
with criminal convictions will exercise the right to vote are beyond the general scope of this
Article, three prevailing alternative rationales merit brief discussion: (1) punishment and
retribution, (2) deterrence, and (3) the regulation of prisons. As noted earlier, theories of
punishment and retributive justice as rationales for vote denial may be challengeable on
independent constitutional grounds. For example, a punitive rationale for felon
disenfranchisement laws may also be constitutionally suspect. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 50,
at 1150; Thompson, supra note 112, at 171, 173. Moreover, these goals are inconsistent with
broader democratic interests of inclusion and participation, especially in light of felon
disenfranchisement's impact on both individuals and communities.
The rationale of deterrence is easily dismissed for its fecklessness. There is no empirical
support for the notion that prospective criminals are deterred by the potential of vote denial.
Indeed, the consequence of vote denial is rarely disclosed at sentencing or in negotiating plea
bargains. As for the regulation of prisons, it is true that prisons are restrictive environments. As
such, prisons have been exempted from the full force of the First Amendment in instances where
penological interests supersede freedom of expression (or association). See, e.g., Shaw v.
Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225 (2001) (holding that the First Amendment does provide inmates a
right to provide legal advice to other inmates so long as restrictions on such communications are
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests" (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89 (1987))); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409 (1989) (upholding restrictions on
publications in prisons if the restrictions are "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests"); Turner, 482 U.S. 78 (upholding general prohibition on inmate correspondence
between institutions); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 127 (1977) (upholding
under the First Amendment restrictions on union organizing by inmates on the grounds that
"[t]he creation of an inmate union will naturally result in increasing the existing friction between
inmates and prison personnel. It can also create friction between union inmates and non-union
inmates"). But see Jones, 433 U.S. at 141 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's
deference to the "rational" exercise of discretion by prison officials in prohibiting union
organizing by inmates).
However, this rationale fails on at least two accounts. Exercising the right to vote does not
threaten a penological interest in the safety, order, or administration of prisons. In fact, two
states, Maine and Vermont, have successfully permitted inmate voting for 180 years without
incident. Vermont, Maine Allow Felon Votes, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Jan. 28, 2006)
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/jan/28/20060128-104343-6528r/ (stating that
Vermont and Maine have allowed felons to vote since their founding 180 years ago) Moreover,
this rationale provides little to no justification for the continued disenfranchisement of citizens
with criminal convictions who are either on parole or have completed their sentences. Second,
and more importantly, if a state's felon disfranchisement laws were motivated by multiple
factors, the "but-for" predominance of impermissible viewpoint discrimination is sufficient to
render the regulation unconstitutional. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 220, 228, 232
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based on viewpoint content, it is unconstitutional despite the existence
of other constitutional justifications. Moreover, if there is no legitimate,
compelling government interest, narrow tailoring is moot.
Accordingly, absent a finding that a state's felon disenfranchisement
scheme is motivated solely by viewpoint-neutral interests, the laws
cannot survive strict scrutiny. Even with this heightened scrutiny,
however, First Amendment Equal Protection analysis would not likely
eradicate all felon disenfranchisement schemes. It would, though, lead
to courts taking a more careful look at their justifications, impact, and
constitutionality.
III. LEGAL AND CONCEPTUAL BARRIERS TO APPLYING FIRST
AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION TO THE VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
CLAIM AGAINST FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Linking felon disenfranchisement to the concept of viewpoint
discrimination may not be enough to convince courts to apply the
nuanced equal protection treatment to these laws that First Amendment
Equal Protection envisions. There are a number of legal and conceptual
barriers that must be addressed, namely whether (1) voting can be
considered speech or expression to trigger First Amendment principles
in the equal protection context; (2) Ramirez is a legal bar to equal
protection claims against felon disenfranchisement; and (3) there are
any further indicia of the Court's view toward First Amendment
application in contexts other than campaign finance and ballot access.
While the judicial theory of viewpoint discrimination set forth in
Section I.B of this Article provides important insight into this last issue,
the Court's partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence illuminates, perhaps
even more explicitly, how the Court conceives of the role of the First
Amendment in voting rights cases. In addition, Ramirez has proved a
formidable barrier to both statutory and constitutional claims against
felon disenfranchisement claims. Accordingly, this Part analyzes
Ramirez and the Court's last pronouncement on felon
disenfranchisement, Hunter v. Underwood, to determine whether an
equal protection claim is legally viable. It starts, however, with a brief
exploration of the linkages between voting and speech or expressive
conduct. This Part ultimately concludes that the potential legal and
conceptual obstacles to First Amendment Equal Protection's application
(1985). As part of the judicial fact-finding consistent with First Amendment Equal Protection,
the Court would have to determine whether a state's viewpoint rationale predominates its
reasons for enacting or maintaining a felon disenfranchisement scheme. To the extent that any
regulation is motivated by impermissible viewpoint discrimination, however, it is subject to
constitutional challenge. See also Figler, supra note 84, at 733-35 ("[D]isenfranchisement
excluded offenders from society and thus increased the likelihood of recidivism.").
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in this context are surmountable.
A. Is Voting Speech?
Historically, the Court has found speech interests in the electoral
arena, specifically in the domains of campaign finance and ballot
access. Although rooted in the doctrinal framework of the First
Amendment, both ballot access and campaign finance cases provide the
doctrinal and ideological moorings in which the Court can anchor a
First Amendment Equal Protection approach to voting rights cases.
Inasmuch as expenditures are a form of expression under the First
229Amendment, so is the act of voting. Moreover, "'[j]ust as excluding
candidates from the ballot 'burdens voters' freedom of association,' so
too does the exclusion of actual voters for a candidate." 230 Coupled with
the powerful concerns of viewpoint discrimination that have animated
First Amendment jurisprudence for two centuries, new vote-denial
issues-such as felon disenfranchisement-are ripe for constitutional
treatment that explores the nexus of First Amendment and equal
protection concerns when viewpoint discrimination is suspected.
Moreover, because the right to vote is itself a legal construct and is not
expressly granted in the Constitution, the "Court is forced to formulate
its own conception of the values served by the right to vote."23 1 The
concept of voting as speech or expressive conduct is nonetheless
surprisingly underdeveloped.232
Of the existing constitutional constructs of expressive conduct,
voting fits most squarely within the concept of political speech.2 33 If
228. See Elora Mukherjee, Abolishing the Time Tax on Voting, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
177, 213-14 (2009) ("Perhaps the connection between the right to vote and the First
Amendment is strongest in the context of ballot access cases.").
229. Justice John Paul Stevens made this point in his dissent in Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.52 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Of course, voting is not speech in a
pure or formal sense, but then again neither is a campaign expenditure; both are nevertheless
communicative acts aimed at influencing electoral outcomes.").
230. Mukherjee, supra note 228, at 213 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 78-
88 (1983)).
231. Winkler, supra note 115, at 334.
232. Professor Pamela Karlan has done the most work to advance the discussion of the
purpose and function of voting. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism
About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1705, 1709-19 (1993) (describing three distinct conceptions
of voting within the broad right to vote); see also Winkler, supra note 115, at 333 ("[V]oting,
like other forms of expression, may be understood to have two roles: it may be used as a vehicle
or tool for communicating ideas (an 'instrumental' role), and it may be used to exert and shape
one's identity without any corresponding desire to convey messages (a 'constitutive' role).").
233. Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 301, 304, 306 (1992)
("[Tihe First Amendment is principally about political deliberation.... [We should] treat
speech as political when it is both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation
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speech is to inform the vote, it follows that the right to vote-the
culmination of listening and expression-is itself speech or expression.
In fact, voting reifies these inputs; it is through the act of voting that
citizens manifest their opinions, ideas, and hopes for governance. 2 34
Meiklejohn is again instructive on this point:
The First Amendment ... protects the freedom of those
activities of thought and communication by which we
"govern." . . . . But . .. voting is merely the external
expression of a wide and diverse number of activities by
means of which citizens attempt to meet the responsibilities
of making judgments, which that freedom to govern lays
upon them.... Self-government can exist only insofar as
the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and
generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory,
casting a ballot is assumed to express.2 35
Moreover, where speech is part of "public discourse"-that is, when
it is "deemed necessary to forge a common democratic will"-First
Amendment protection serves the broader goal of democratic
legitimacy.236
Regardless of whether one accepts the assertion that voting
constitutes speech and expression as defined within First Amendment
jurisprudence,237 there are sufficient similarities between (1) voting and
about some issue... . Restrictions on political speech have the distinctive feature of impairing
the ordinary channels for political change.. .. [G]overnment should be under a special burden
of justification when it seeks to control speech intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation."); Winkler, supra note 115, at 334 ("[Clonceptualized under the constitutional
doctrine of free speech, voting would be paradigmatic of political speech...."); see also Cass
R. Sunstein, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
234. Winkler, supra note 115, at 334. But see Winkler, supra note 115, at 338 ("[Elven
understood to have expressive components, voting is but a muted and limited form of speech
with a confined range of expressions available to the voter.").
235. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245,
255-57 (1961).
236. Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 41 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 169, 176 (2007); see also Post, supra note 36, at 483, 484 ("Public discourse is
presumptively within the scope of the First Amendment.... All citizens within public
discourse, and their audiences within public discourse, have equal autonomy [to engage in the
formation of public opinion], which reflects the political equality that all citizens enjoy within a
democracy.").
237. Arguments abound as to why voting should or should not be considered speech or
expression. For a thorough disquisition of voting's traits as expressive activity, see, for example,
Winkler, supra note 115, at 333, 338-49 ("Voting is essentially an expressive exercise. By
voting, the individual shows something of herself, displaying desires, beliefs, judgments, and
perceptions. The voter gives voice to her sentiments and views, concretizes them, and asserts
them, though anonymously, through the marking of a candidate's name or the 'yes' or 'no' of a
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(2) traditional speech and expressive activities to warrant application of
First Amendment Equal Protection. Furthermore, under the theory of
"electoral exceptionalism," activity in the electoral context-especially
voting-deserves special protection and differentiated regulation.238
B. Confronting Precedent: The Importance of Ramirez and Hunter
Despite the racially disparate impact of felon disenfranchisement
laws, as well as the Voting Rights Act's broad prohibition on all voting
practices that result in denial or abridgement of voting rights on account
of race,239 most challenges to felon disenfranchisement under the Act
have failed. To date, Ramirez's sanction of felon disenfranchisement
has made it statutorily unassailable. In addition, direct constitutional
attacks on felon disenfranchisement laws based on the unequal
treatment of citizens with criminal convictions are directly precluded by
Ramirez.
A handful of felon disenfranchisement cases have raised First
Amendment challenges, which courts have routinely dismissed with
virtually no analysis on the ground that the First Amendment does not
provide a right to vote for citizens with felony convictions. 240 The
referendum. This may be a communicative effort, one that creates a link between the voter and
someone else-for example, government officials, political parties, or the general public-and
passes a message from one to the other.").
238. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 583, 560 (1964) ("No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as
good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that
unnecessarily abridges this right." (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964))).
Voting is also a dimension of citizenship. See Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Law, and the
American Nation, 7 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. 595, 597-98 (2000) ("Voting, of course, is not
primarily the power to affect choices of the public officeholders and public policies; it is the
preeminent expression of citizenship, of identity as an equal member of the national
community.") (citation omitted); see also supra note 45.
239. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000) (prohibiting any "voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting or standard, practice, or procedure ... which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color").
240. See Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333, 2000 WL 203984, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished) (per curiam) ("The First Amendment creates no private right of action for seeking
reinstatement of previously canceled voting rights. Therefore, the district court correctly
dismissed Howard's claim to the extent it was founded upon the First Amendment."); Lawrie v.
Harris, 2011 WL 3501000, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011) ("The First Amendment does not
guarantee felons the right to vote."); Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00 CIV. 8586 (LMM), 2004 WL
1335921, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004), af'd and remanded, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006), and
af'd and remanded sub nom. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[T]he case law
is clear that the First Amendment does not guarantee felons the right to vote."); Johnson v.
Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2002) ("[lIt is clear that the First Amendment does
not guarantee felons the right to vote."); Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1314 (E.D.
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district court in Farrakhan v. Locke gave this issue the most detailed
treatment in its single-sentence holding: "[T]o uphold these claims
against Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court would have to
conclude that the same Constitution that recognizes felon
disenfranchisement under § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment also
prohibits disenfranchisement under other amendments." 24 1 However,
the Farrakhan court's invocation of the Ramirez rationale for
jettisoning the First Amendment challenge to Washington State's felon
disenfranchisement laws was misplaced. As Hunter demonstrated,
Ramirez did not foreclose all constitutional challenges to felon
disenfranchisement laws. Indeed, Ramirez does not preclude
constitutional claims that do not challenge states' general authority to
enact felon disenfranchisement pursuant to the Court's reading of
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Carrington and its progeny
provide the basis for such a claim in the form of viewpoint
discrimination. To consider how viewpoint discrimination can inform
an equal protection challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws, it is
helpful to understand the speech implications of voting, as well as how
and the extent to which the Ramirez decision informs new constitutional
challenges.
In applying Ramirez, courts have repeatedly held that, absent proof
of intentional racial discrimination in the enactment of the statute, states
enjoy a blanket sanction to disenfranchise persons with criminal
convictions because Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains
text acknowledging the extant practice.242  Indeed, felon
disenfranchisement laws have enjoyed special protection from
constitutional scrutiny under Ramirez based on the Court's textual
reading of Sections 1 and 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 243 This
Wash. 1997) (finding that to hold the same Constitution that specifically recognizes felon
disenfranchisement under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment also prohibits
disenfranchisement under another amendment would be to interpret the Constitution in an
inconsistent manner). But see Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 416 (Cal. 1966) abrogated by
Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199 (1973) ("While the right to vote is not among the specifically
enumerated rights of the First Amendment, it is nevertheless one which 'this (Supreme) Court
has been so zealous to protect."') (citing Carrington, 380 U.S. at 96).
241. Farrakhan, 987 F. Supp. at 1314.
242. See supra Section III.A; see also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55-56 (1974);
Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1338; Farrakhan, 987 F. Supp. at 1314.
243. See Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54-55 ("We hold that the understanding of those who
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in the express language of § 2 and in the
historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendment's applicability to state laws
disenfranchising felons, is of controlling significance in distinguishing such laws from those
other state limitations on the franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause by this Court. . . . [T]hat § 1, in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not have been
meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less
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rationale suggests that the constitutional recognition of a practice
confers impermeable constitutional protection. Alternatively, courts
have used the justification that the framers did not expressly ban states
from disenfranchising felons. 244 While the Court has recognized
intentional racial discrimination as one impermissible justification for
245
such laws, viewpoint discrimination has not yet been asserted as a
basis for challenging felon disenfranchisement statutes despite some
scholarly recognition of this claim.246
As noted above, Ramirez held that denying citizens with felony
convictions voting rights is not an equal protection violation because
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment references and, therefore,
permits this practice.247 However, as Hunter v. Underwood instructs,
Ramirez does not control the interpretation of Section 2 when that
clause competes with other constitutional rights.
Eleven years after deciding Ramirez, in Hunter, the Court applied
strict scrutiny to Alabama's felon disenfranchisement scheme and held
it unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.248 Without
disturbing its earlier holding that Section 2 implicitly authorizes states
to deny the vote to citizens with felony convictions, the Court stated,
"We are confident that § 2 was not designed to permit the purposeful
racial discrimination attending the enactment and operation of
[Alabama's felon disenfranchisement law] which otherwise violates § 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in our opinion in [Ramirez]
drastic sanction of reduced representation which § 2 imposed for other forms of
disenfranchisement.").
244. See id. at 43; Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1338; Farrakhan, 987 F. Supp. at 1314.
245. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 220, 225 (1985). Hunter relied on both the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments for its holding, which allowed the Court to avoid the argument that
the acknowledgment of the practice contained in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment could
not have been outlawed by Section 1. Accepting this interpretation, arguendo, still leaves other
constitutional provisions to be tested against Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
extent that they are in tension.
246. Indeed, the assertion that felon disenfranchisement laws operate as a form of
viewpoint discrimination does not originate with this Article. Pamela Karlan and others have
drawn the connection between the group of cases that prohibit vote denial that is based on how
one might vote and the justifications for felon disenfranchisement. See Karlan, Convictions and
Doubts, supra note 50 (discussing causes and consequences of various approaches to felon
disenfranchisement); see also Figler, supra note 84, at 733-35; Wilkins, supra note 78, at 108-
09.
247. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts, supra note 50, at 1153-54.
248. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 225, 233 (applying Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429
U.S. 252, 265 (1977); see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-30 (1969)
(detailing the reasons for applying strict scrutiny to restrictions on the right to vote); Otsuka v.
Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 416-18 (applying strict scrutiny to vote denial claim).
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suggests the contrary. 249 Hunter's challenge to discrimination in the
enactment of felon disenfranchisement laws thus demonstrates that,
where specific constitutional protections are threatened, felon
disenfranchisement statutes are not immune to challenge.
Accordingly, a viewpoint-based First Amendment Equal Protection
challenge does not contravene the Court's holding in Ramirez. Such a
challenge is consistent with Hunter's application of strict scrutiny to
these laws when the equality protections of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment are threatened. Certainly, nothing in a First Amendment
viewpoint discrimination challenge upsets the precedent in Ramirez or
earlier vote denial cases that "[r]esidence requirements, age, [and]
previous criminal record are obvious examples indicating factors which
a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications of
voters." 25 0 Rather, a viewpoint discrimination challenge pits the First
Amendment's freedom of expression protection and the Equal
Protection Clause's fundamental rights jurisprudence against Ramirez's
license to lawfully disenfranchise citizens with felony convictions.251
In determining the constitutionality of the statute, the Hunter Court
took account of the legislative record that demonstrated discriminatory
intent,252 as well as the racially disproportionate impact of Alabama's
racially neutral disenfranchising provisions. Specifically, the Court
noted that, as of 1903, the statute had disenfranchised approximately ten
times as many blacks as whites, and that at the time of the decision a
disparate effect persisted to such an extent that in Jefferson and
Montgomery Counties, African-Americans were at least 1.7 times as
likely as whites to be disenfranchised by the statute. 253 Significantly,
Hunter was also a mixed-motive case. The state proffered a defense that
the intent of the law was not only to disenfranchise blacks, but also to
disenfranchise poor whites.2 54 Without deciding "[w]hether or not
249. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233; see also Ortiz, supra note 162, at 1131 ("Even though the
state argued that the fourteenth amendment itself expressly contemplated such exclusions, the
inference of intent proved unrebuttable.").
250. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974) (quoting Lassiter v. Northampton
Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)) (internal citations omitted).
251. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) ("[W]here fundamental
rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." (citing Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 115 (1966);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 580-81 (1965)
(Black, J., concurring)); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 583, 561-62 (1964).
252. The Court found undisputed evidence that a "zeal for white supremacy ran rampant at
the convention" at which Alabama's felon disfranchisement laws were enacted. Hunter, 471
U.S. at 229.
253. Id. at 227.
254. Id. at 232.
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intentional disenfranchisement of poor whites would qualify as a
'permissible motive' . . . [the Court held that] an additional purpose to
discriminate against poor whites would not render nugatory the purpose
to discriminate against all blacks" where racial discrimination was a
"but-for" motivation. 2 55
While Ramirez is a formidable barrier to general equal protection
claims, it does not bar equal protection or other constitutional
challenges that are based on suspect classifications or, as this Article
suggests, independent constitutional principles such as viewpoint
discrimination.
C. First Amendment Lessons from Partisan Gerrymandering
The judicial theory of viewpoint discrimination set forth above
indicates that the Court has applied First Amendment principles in vote
denial cases. These cases do not, however, reflect the Court's thinking
on applying the First Amendment in such cases. On the other hand, in
the realm of partisan redistricting, certain members of the Court have
beckoned the First Amendment to settle what has proved to be a
theoretically justiciable but practically impossible legal claim.
The Equal Protection Clause has long defined the jurisprudence
surrounding constitutional challenges in the area of redistricting.
Indeed, the one person, one vote cases, grounded in the Equal
Protection Clause, spurred a reapportionment revolution and subsequent
redistricting phenomenon.256 However, there is some acknowledgement
by the Court that it may not be the only constitutional provision that
addresses these concerns, especially in the realm of partisan
gerrymandering. Partisan gerrymandering, the act of redistricting with
excessive emphasis on voters' party affiliation, invokes viewpoint
discrimination theory because the motive for manipulating electoral
lines in the challenged configuration is based on the ideolo ical
viewpoint of the voters as expressed by their party affiliation. In
255. Id.
256. See Joseph C. Coates, III, Comment, The Court Confronts the Gerrymander, 15 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 351, 352 (1987) ("The apportionment revolution began with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, holding that malapportionment was a justiciable
issue.") (footnote omitted, discussing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)); see also Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 568 ("we hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause
requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a
population basis.").
257. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287-88, 314 (2004) ("The First Amendment may
be the more relevant constitutional provision in future cases that allege unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering. After all, these allegations involve the First Amendment interest of not
burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process, their
voting history, their association with a political party, or their expression of political views.").
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Vieth v. Jubelier258 and League of United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC) v. Perry,259 the Court briefly explored the First Amendment's
application in partisan gerrymandering cases. Vieth established that
voters affiliated with a political party can sue to block implementation
of a congressional redistricting plan on the grounds that it was
manipulated for purely political reasons, but the Court found no
violation on these grounds based on the case's facts. Instead, the Court
held that the Pennsylvania congressional plan created by the
Republican-led legislature violated the principle of one person, one
vote.
Among Vieth's highly fractured opinions, Justice Anthony Kennedy
wrote that "First Amendment concerns arise where a State enacts a law
that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their
party to disfavored treatment by reason of their views."260 In such cases,
he argued, strict scrutiny must be applied because of the burden the state
places on representational rights and the state's consideration of
political views.261 Absent a narrowly tailored compelling government
interest, these laws would fail.2 62
Justice Kennedy further noted that "[t]he First Amendment may be
the more relevant constitutional provision"263 in gerrymandering cases
because of the limitations of the Equal Protection Clause's
classification-focused approach in contexts beyond race: The Equal
Protection Clause analysis "presents a more complicated question when
the inquiry is whether a generally permissible classification has been
used for an impermissible purpose. That question can only be answered
in the affirmative by the subsidiary showing that the classification as
applied imposes unlawful burdens." 64 To be sure, rather than focusing
on the permissibility of the voter classification according to equal
protection jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy's First Amendment approach
would consider the extent of the burden on representational rights.265
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Vieth, which provided the fifth vote for
the judgment, therefore marks an important development in recognizing
258. Id.
259. 548 U.S. 399,461-62 (2006).




264. Id. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
265. Id. Justice Kennedy did not define representational rights for these purposes. See, e.g.,
ISSACHAROFF & KARLAN, supra note 132, at 564 (critiquing Justice Stevens's hybrid approach
on, among other the grounds, the ground that "'representational rights' are as yet undefined");




the interrelation of First Amendment principles and equal protection
claims in election law.
Justice John Paul Stevens joined Justice Kennedy's endorsement of a
First Amendment approach to partisan gerrymandering in Vieth and
continued developing this idea in the vein of political neutrality in
League of United Latin American Citizens (L ULA C) v. Perry.266 LULAC
involved the infamous mid-decade redistricting of Texas congressional
seats at the behest of Representative Tom Delay, which sent Democratic
legislators fleeing from the state to prevent quorum. There the Court
held 7-2 that the resulting plan (for the entire state and the Dallas area)
was not an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, and that states could
redistrict mid-decade as appropriate. In addition, however, the Court
held 5-4 that the state's dismantling of one majority-minority district
(District 23), as it was positioned to oust an incumbent, denied those
voters an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice in violation of
the Voting Rights Act.26 8 Justice Stevens's concurrence and dissent in
LULAC briefly developed Justice Kennedy's First Amendment overture
from Vieth, but took it one step further by joining the Equal Protection
Clause and First Amendment analyses:
The requirements of the Federal Constitution that limit the
State's power to rely exclusively on partisan preferences in
drawing district lines are the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition against invidious discrimination, and the First
Amendment's protection of citizens from official retaliation
based on their political affiliation. The equal protection
component of the Fourteenth Amendment requires actions
taken by the sovereign to be supported by some legitimate
interest, and further establishes that a bare desire to harm a
politically disfavored group is not a legitimate interest.
Similarly, the freedom of political belief and association
guaranteed by the First Amendment prevents the State,
absent a compelling interest, from 'penalizing citizens
because of their participation in the electoral
process,... their association with a political party, or their
expression of political views.' 269
266. 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 427. The Court, though, failed to hold that an African-American plurality district
and another potential Latino district were protected under the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 425.
269. Id. at 462 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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Justice Stevens's approach broadens the analysis to include the
state's motivations in burdening voters' rights.270 Among the
impermissible motivations or justifications are exclusionary reasons-
reasons that "are simply excluded from being acceptable bases for
action."271 Writing for the majority in LULAC, Justice Kennedy also
echoed these sentiments. He noted that "even if. . . the State's action
was taken primarily for political, not racial, reasons,"272 that does not
change the constitutional analysis. Indeed, one possible reading of
Justice Kennedy's First Amendment Equal Protection approach to
partisan gerrymandering is that it is a limitation on a state's ability to
273infringe voting rights for a constitutionally impermissible reason.
These reasons do not need to be based on a racial classification and,
importantly, can be based on a lawful classification. Rather, the inquiry
is "whether a generally permissible classification has been used for an
impermissible purpose. 24 Justice Kennedy's conclusion that the Texas
legislature's dismantling of a majority Latino district because Latinos
were poised to avail themselves of the opportunity to elect a candidate
of their choice "bears the mark of intentional discrimination that could
give rise to an equal protection violation" underscores this point.275 The
Latino voters in LULAC were denied certain rights of representation
based on how they intended to exercise the right to vote-that is, based
on who they intended to vote for.
It is true that Justice Kennedy's approach in Vieth was roundly
rebuffed by a plurality of the Court in Vieth,276 and Justice Stevens's
suggested hybrid equal protection-First Amendment analysis has not
been developed further. Still, Vieth and LULAC demonstrate that the
connection between the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause in the realm of election law has not been lost on all members of
the Court. Some election law scholars have taken up the mantle of
pursuing the First Amendment's applicability to partisan
270. See Charles, supra note 265, at 1201 ("LULAC adds an additional element into the
inquiry: the justification for the classification. The inquiry is not only whether a permissible
political classification was used that burdened a group of voters; the inquiry also includes
whether the State had an impermissible reason for imposing this burden.").
271. Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 714 (1994).
272. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 440.
273. Charles, supra note 265, at 1196-202.
274. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 315 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
275. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 440 ("In essence, the state took away the Latinos' opportunity
because Latinos were about to exercise it.").
276. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 301-04.
2013] 169
gerrymandering 2 77  amid broad criticism of applying the First
Amendment to such claims. 2 78 However, the principal critique of Justice
Kennedy's approach, in most instances, is directly linked to the vagaries
of redistricting and the difficulty in discernin motive among all the
other factors that contribute to redistricting. This problem is less
pronounced concerning felon disenfranchisement and far more
remediable. When enacting felon disenfranchisement laws, legislatures
are certainly considering many factors; however, the universe of
justifications is much smaller. If potential voters are denied the
franchise because of the viewpoint they are expected to express at the
polls, then the law is suspect even though the legislature's motive may
be mixed with other rationales.280 Whether any consideration-or the
extent of consideration--of viewpoint in the context of redistricting is
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation is still.a perplexing
matter for the Court; one that is beyond the scope of this analysis.
Suffice it to say, however, that viewing First Amendment principles as
applicable to gerrymandering (as Justices Kennedy and Stevens do)
makes it easier to view First Amendment principles as applicable to
vote denial cases such as felon disenfranchisement.
Moreover, finding a viewpoint discrimination connection to felon
disenfranchisement laws would not upend legislative practices as it
would with those in the context of partisan redistricting. Unlike the
277. See David A. Schultz, The Party's Over: Partisan Gerrymandering and the First
Amendment, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 26 (2007) (arguing that liberalism provides the theoretical
basis for applying the First Amendment to partisan gerrymandering cases); Timothy D. Caum,
II, Partisan Gerrymandering Challenges in Light of Vieth v. Jubelirer: A First Amendment
Alternative, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 287, 289 (2005) (arguing that the First
Amendment provides a more "plausible" basis for challenges to partisan gerrymandering than
the Equal Protection Clause).
278. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan
Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 397, 401-10 (2005); Richard L. Hasen,
Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims after Vieth,
3 ELECTION L.J. 626 (2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=561243, 28-29 (criticizing Justice Kennedy's suggestion in Vieth of a possibly
emergent First Amendment test) ("Justice Kennedy's First Amendment 'burden:'
[test] ... inevitably would lead courts to develop multipart tests for separating permissible from
impermissible use of partisan information in districting . . . .").
279. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286 ("[T]he fact that partisan districting is a lawful and common
practice means that there is almost always room for an election-impeding lawsuit contending
that partisan advantage was the predominant motivation; not so for claims of racial
gerrymandering.").
280. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 220, 232 (1985) ("Whether or not intentional
disenfranchisement of poor whites would qualify as a 'permissible motive' . . . it is clear that
where both impermissible racial motivation and racially discriminatory impact are
demonstrated . .. an additional [permissible] purpose .. . would not render nugatory the purpose
to discriminate against all blacks . . . .").
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enactment of felon disenfranchisement laws, in the course of
redistricting, legislatures must balance numerous interests and concerns
while abiding by traditional redistricting criteria, including incumbency
protection, which naturally invites consideration of voters' party
affiliation. By contrast, the perceived viewpoint of the voter is
entirely irrelevant to the right to vote and should never play a role in
determining voter eligibility.
With respect to partisan gerrymandering, one scholar has noted that
"[t]he question for the Court's gerrymandering jurisprudence is whether
there are limitations on a State's ability to alter electoral structures when
voter preferences are inimical to the state's preferences. What is the
purpose of elections if a state will repeatedly seek to impose its
preferences on the electoral process?" 282 Similar questions remain for
felon disenfranchisement. Will the Court permit states to alter the
composition of their electorates when that action is motivated by a
desire to exclude a group of citizens based on how they may vote? Will
this unlawfully diminish the purpose and integrity of elections?
CONCLUSION
Of the U.S. Constitution's twenty-seven amendments, five expand
the right to vote to include groups of citizens that were once denied that
right for what would now be considered discriminatory purposes.283
Some groups once considered "unpopular" under the law were denied
the right to vote based on the same moralistic and functional
justifications that are today used to defend felon disenfranchisement. It
is well-established that Ramirez permits intentional discrimination
against citizens with felony convictions, in the form of vote denial,
because of their status as felons. It stretches Ramirez's holding beyond
constitutional limits, though, to interpret it to permit intentional
discrimination in the form of vote denial because of how felons may
281. As long as incumbency protection is a legitimate redistricting criterion, party
affiliation will factor in to the districting equation. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy has
questioned the propriety of this criterion precisely for the potential conflict it poses to
constituent interests and its potential exclusionary harm. See United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 441 (2006) ("If... incumbency protection means excluding
some voters from the district simply because they are likely to vote against the officeholder, the
change is to benefit the officeholder, not the voters.").
282. Charles, supra note 265, at 1198.
283. Indeed, the right to vote has been shaped by amendments to the Constitution rather
than an affirmative grant. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf& Samuel Issachoroff, Can Process Theory
Constrain Courts?, 72 U. CoLO. L. REv. 923, 923 (2001) ("The Constitution is supposed to
enable democratic politics and establish its outer bounds. Yet the original Constitution
performed this task only inferentially, leaving most of the details to either subsequent




As the development of election law directs us toward more nuanced
conceptions of equality in the political arena, the justifications for felon
disenfranchisement laws-especially when viewed in the context of
their impact on racial minorities and poor populations-weaken
significantl. Because there is no "organizing principle to 'the law of
politics,"' 2  cross-pollination between substantively related doctrines
like the First Amendment and Equal Protection can inform the
protection of the right to vote against various forms of discrimination,
even those society is not yet willing to recognize. Indeed, if we take
seriously Justice William 0. Douglas's trenchant pronouncement that
"the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a
particular era," 285 then expanding current conceptions of the Clause's
interaction with other fundamental rights is appropriate.286 The opinion
in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, from which this observation
originates, further counsels that "[n]otions of what constitutes equal
treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change,"
especially concerning the protection of fundamental rights. 287 This is
particularly true concerning groups that have been disfavored or
discriminated against historically. Undeniably, the central lesson of the
century-plus struggle toward universal suffrage, and the expansion of
constitutional protections more generally, is that "an understanding of
our Constitution, for our Constitution will be tested again and again by
unpopular people and unpopular causes." 288 Applying First Amendment
Equal Protection to felon disenfranchisement laws that are grounded in
viewpoint discrimination meets this challenge by safeguarding and
connecting the principles of equality in the constitutional provisions
where they are valued most.
284. Pildes, supra note 271, at 18.
285. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
286. The Court in Harper stated that "[i]n determining what lines are unconstitutionally
discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we
have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the
limits of fundamental rights." Id.
287. Id. (noting that in 1896, seven of the eight then sitting Justices upheld under the Equal
Protection Clause laws providing for separate public facilities based on race, which were later
held to constitute "unequal and discriminatory treatment that sound strange to a contemporary
ear" (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896))).
288. FRANK H. ARMANI, PRIVILEGED INFORMATION 1 (1984).
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